General Bacha Debele’s article presents a characteristically Ethiopian nationalist perspective on the Red Sea issue, skillfully blending pragmatic language with a deep-seated narrative of historical grievance and a thinly veiled threat. While it calls for cooperation, its foundational premises are so fundamentally one-sided and dismissive of Eritrean sovereignty that they ultimately undermine its own stated goal.

Here is a counter-analysis of its core arguments:

1. On the “Existential Imperative” and Historical Grievance:

• The Article’s Claim: Ethiopia’s need for sea access is an “existential imperative” due to an “unjust” deprivation in 1993. It challenges the legal legitimacy of its loss of Assab and frames the issue as a demand for “historical truth.”
• The Counter-Response: This framing is the primary obstacle to cooperation. It resurrects the central ideological conflict that led to a 30-year war. The 1993 Eritrean independence referendum was conducted with overwhelming international recognition and Ethiopian consent. To now question its legal and moral foundation is to question the very basis of Eritrea’s statehood. For Eritrea, this is not a negotiating point; it is a non-starter. An “existential imperative” for one nation cannot be pursued by threatening the existential sovereignty of another. True pragmatism would accept the 1991-1993 settlement as the immutable foundation for all future talks, not as a subject for “continuous reflection” and re-litigation.

2. On the Portrayal of Eritrea and Its Leadership:

• The Article’s Claim: Eritrea is a “stagnant,” “closed,” “totalitarian” state, a “political relic” whose leadership is isolated, illegitimate, and betrays its own people.
• The Counter-Response: This ad hominem attack on President Isaias and the Eritrean state is not a basis for diplomacy; it is a provocation. Regardless of the accuracy of these criticisms, using them as a preamble to a call for “cooperation” is deeply disingenuous. It positions Ethiopia as both judge and interested party, demanding partnership from a regime it simultaneously declares morally and politically bankrupt. A genuine pragmatist would engage with the state as it is, not as they wish it to be, and would avoid inflammatory language that guarantees a defensive and hostile response.

3. On the Accusations and the “Burden of Restraint”:

• The Article’s Claim: Ethiopia has shown “maximum restraint” while Eritrea “recklessly” undermines it by supporting insurgents and engaging in illicit activities. It places the entire “burden of maintaining stability” on Ethiopia.
• The Counter-Response: This narrative completely inverts the recent history of the region. From an Eritrean and regional perspective, it was Ethiopia under Abiy Ahmed that unilaterally tore up the foundational 2018 peace agreement by reigniting the Tigray conflict in 2020, drawing Eritrea into a devastating war. The article’s portrayal of Ethiopia as the perpetual victim of Eritrean aggression ignores this pivotal context. The claim of “restraint” rings hollow to those who witnessed the consequences of that conflict. The “burden of stability” is a shared one, and Ethiopia’s own actions have been the single greatest destabilizing factor in the Horn in recent years.

4. On the Nature of “Pragmatic Cooperation”:

• The Article’s Claim: The solution is “pragmatic, mutually beneficial cooperation,” which it defines as joint ventures in ports and logistics.
• The Counter-Response: The article’s concept of “pragmatism” is entirely transactional and self-serving. It proposes cooperation on Ethiopian terms, predicated on Ethiopia’s needs, while demanding Eritrea abandon its core security posture. For Eritrea, which fought a long war for sovereignty, security is paramount. Its “isolation” is, from its perspective, a defensive necessity against a much larger and historically dominant neighbor that has never fully accepted its separation. True pragmatism would require Ethiopia to first provide irreversible security guarantees and demonstrate through sustained action that it respects Eritrea’s sovereignty unconditionally. Only then could talks about port access be credible.

Conclusion:

General Bacha’s article, despite its polished language, is not a genuine offer of partnership. It is an ultimatum disguised as diplomacy. It tells Eritrea: “Your state is a failed relic, your leader is a tyrant, your independence is legally questionable, and you are a source of instability. Now, please grant us sovereign access to your coast for our existential needs.”

This approach is destined to fail. It reinforces every Eritrean suspicion about Ethiopian hegemony. If Ethiopia sincerely desires Red Sea access, it must abandon the language of historical grievance and moral superiority. It must:

1. Formally and unequivocally reaffirm the borders established in 1993.
2. Engage in quiet, respectful diplomacy without public preconditions and inflammatory rhetoric.
3. Acknowledge its role in regional instability and work to rebuild decimated trust.

The “defining moment” for the Horn of Africa is not whether Eritrea capitulates to Ethiopian demands, but whether Ethiopia can evolve beyond a neo-imperial mindset that views its neighbors as extensions of its own national destiny. Until it does, the Red Sea will remain not a conduit for shared prosperity, but a moat guarding against a past Eritrea will never accept again.

How has ODF’s platform evolved since its founding?

The platform of the Oromian Defense Force (ODF), often associated with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), has evolved significantly since its founding. While the core principle of national self-determination for the Oromo has remained constant, the specific vision and political tactics have adapted to changing conditions in Ethiopia.[1][2][3]

Early Objectives: Independence and Liberation
At its founding in 1973, the OLF/ODF’s primary goal was achieving full independence for Oromia, framed as liberation from what was perceived as Abyssinian (Amhara) colonial rule. This initially included calls for the creation of a sovereign Oromo state outside of Ethiopia, accompanied by armed struggle against the government.[2][4][1]

Evolution to Self-Determination Within a Federal Ethiopia
Over time, especially after Ethiopia’s regime change in 1991, the OLF began shifting toward the idea of national self-determination—asserting the right of the Oromo to decide, through a democratic process, whether to remain within a restructured, truly federal Ethiopia or pursue independence. The platform emphasized voluntary union with other nations based on equality and mutual respect rather than enforced secession.[1][2]

Engagement and Withdrawal from Federal Politics
The OLF participated in Ethiopia’s transitional government after the fall of the Derg regime in 1991, indicating willingness to cooperate with broader Ethiopian movements. However, citing harassment and political exclusion, the OLF soon withdrew, reinforcing its orientation toward armed struggle and political autonomy.[5][1]

Shift Toward Democratization and Inclusive Struggle
By the 2010s and especially after 2012, some OLF factions voiced a willingness to work for democracy and freedom within Ethiopia rather than outright secession. This broadening of goals to include justice, democratization, and inclusion emerged more strongly during the Abiy Ahmed era.[3][5][1]

Recent Developments: Unity, Decentralization, and Peace
Recent ODF and OLA documents highlight continued emphasis on:
– Self-determination and responsive government via democratic means[3]
– Economic sovereignty and development for the Oromo people[3]
– Socio-cultural rights: language, culture, local governance[3]
– The possibility of a political union with other Ethiopian groups based on voluntary association and equality, rather than either forced unity or imposed independence[2][1]
– Openness to negotiation and peaceful resolution, alongside continued resistance to central state repression[6][3]

Factional Complexity
The evolution of the ODF’s platform has also included internal splits, such as the division between the OLF and the OLA over armed resistance and disarmament processes. These reflect broader debates within Oromo nationalism regarding practical versus maximalist goals, and engagement versus resistance, as Ethiopia’s political context has shifted.[5][6]

Overall, the ODF’s platform evolved from calls for independence to a nuanced program of self-determination, democratization, and potential federal partnership—adapted to challenges and opportunities presented by Ethiopian politics since the 1970s.[1][2][5][3]

Sources
[1] Oromo Liberation Front – Wikipediaen.wikipedia.org › wiki › Oromo_Liberation_Front https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oromo_Liberation_Front
[2] Mission – Oromo Liberation Front https://oromoliberationfront.org/english/mission/
[3] A BRIEF POLITICAL MANIFESTO https://www.fnnmedia.org/media/images/OLA_Brief_Manifesto.pdf
[4] Political program of Oromia Liberation Front- O.L.F – FINFINNE MEDIA http://samsondoya.blogspot.com/2013/08/political-program-of-oromia-liberation.html
[5] Country policy and information note: Oromos, the … https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ethiopia-country-policy-and-information-notes/country-policy-and-information-note-oromos-the-oromo-liberation-front-and-the-oromo-liberation-army-ethiopia-march-2022-accessible
[6] About the Oromo Liberation Army | OLF-OLA https://www.olf-olahq.org/about
[7] Open Dialogue Foundation https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_Dialogue_Foundation
[8] Clark Anna 2010, ‘Politicians Using History’, Wiley https://opus.lib.uts.edu.au/bitstream/10453/14057/1/2009008262.pdf
[9] The good old days: how nostalgia clouds our view of … https://theconversation.com/the-good-old-days-how-nostalgia-clouds-our-view-of-political-crises-52309
[10] Oromo Liberation Army – Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oromo_Liberation_Army