By: Najat Hamza
The Oromo protest movement from 2014 to 2016 has secured a regime change or a change in power in Ethiopia. The power structure and the remnants of the past regime emerged as a reformed body to carry the country forward into a democracy. There were a significant and promising start initially, but it was short lived. The regime reverted to its old bloody ways and actively started to work against the very movement that made the reform possible.

The Oromo people fought for the change and ushered the change in but sadly have fallen victims’ ones more. Our leaders are imprisoned on bogus charges, our political organizations are paralyzed, our identity is under attack and our people are being hunted daily. This is true for all nations and nationalities in one form or another. The unitary system came back with vengeance to eliminate and eradicate our diverse identity and every gain we achieved in the past five decades. The main goal or reason is to disable the Oromo struggle and squash the aspirations of millions so that Ethiopia can thrive in the image that they want. The Ethiopia that excludes, executes dissident voices and mold ethnicities into one bland identity they call Ethiopiawinet.

There is no doubt that Ethiopia has descended into uncharted territories since Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed came to power. Oromo people is the target of Abiy regime because they are the biggest defenders of federalism. We know that federalism is on trial. That means all nations and nationalities of Ethiopia should stand together not only defend federalism but implement it in its full potential. How? By standing in solidarity with one another in clear and defined way. What does that solidarity look like? How can we move together in securing the future for all federalist forces and chart a better future for all involved? We can answer most of these questions if we look at political solidarity and the framework it requires to deliver the results we want.

Political solidarity for all federalist forces should be defined and structured in a way each individual body can secure a better future for ourselves and collectively as a country. The goal of political solidarity is to effect social, political, and cultural landscape of Ethiopia into an inclusive space. The responsibilities of the federalist forces should be defined and carried out. Our political solidarity is based on the idea of fighting injustice and oppression together as one body. The responsibility of each member is to defend federalism, to be a voice for our people and to curve the future we can see ourselves in. The Oromo protests is a movement created to carry out these core goals of fighting injustice and oppression in Ethiopia. We understand the current Ethiopian media landscape and government supporters across the globe is busy painting the Oromo protests in a negative light. We have shown the world Oromo protests is a peaceful movement fighting to change the fate of Oromo people and other nations and nationalities facing the same treatment.

Therefore, all the federalist forces should come together in a meaningful way to fight for our future together. It is beautiful to show up together in rallies with our beautiful flags to say we stand with one another, but it needs to translate to a tangible solidarity, a political solidarity. A political solidarity of federalist forces means pulling our resources together, to stand together, to participate actively to effort on the ground across Ethiopia and to collectively be a voice here in the diaspora. We have a duty and responsibility to stand together to protect our future, our perspective regions, and our people from harm. When Oromo people are calling for market boycott, protesting across Oromia or they launch a campaign against the government join it for more impact. We do not have to wait until each area is targeted to react. We must work hard to harness a collective support for our efforts to bring the change we desire.

Political solidarity can be an effective model of change when we clearly identify our responsibilities and duties as federalist forces. This is not an era of empty rhetoric or empty promises. It is time to put our words and actions together and breakdown this system of oppression for once and for all. That comes with the understanding the Oromo protest is your protest. It is a protest movement of all subjugated nations and nationalities of Ethiopia. The time to stand together with purpose is now. #OromoProtests #UnitedWeStand #AbiyMustGo #FreeAllPoliticalPrisoners

By Dr. Tilahun Gamta* 1st August 2020

Many Oromos wonder how I was able to write and publish The Oromo-English Dictionary (OED) in Ethiopia under Mengistu’s regime, a regime that had been openly hostile to the Oromo nation. Here, I offer my reflections on the writing of the work and some of the difficulties encountered in publishing it.

Before I began writing the OED on May 1, 1980, I had leaked out the news that I was in the process of writing an Amharic-Oromo-English trilingual dictionary. Some of my Abyssinian colleagues at Addis Ababa University (AAU) were more excited about the idea than I was. The appearance of “Amharic,” though ostensible, at the beginning of the trilingual dictionary probably explains why they showered good wishes upon me. Very soon, my name and the title of the elusive project appeared in one of Addis Ababa University’s research news bulletins. To complete this ‘ingenious’ project without any difficulty, I was advised to submit a research proposal so that I could be entitled to a grant and a reduced teaching load. I thanked my enthusiastic Abyssinian friends and tacitly ignored the suggestion because I did not want to commit myself, in writing, to undertake the so-called ingenious project.

I believe that the regime’s ubiquitous security members took my story on trust because, after the news release, I could move about freely and mingle with Oromos with whom I had parted company at my village (Bure) when I was about thirteen years old. Thus, I was able to refresh my memory of how our people in the rural areas still speak Afaan Oromo, the Oromo language, in spite of one hundred years ofthe flagrant policy of suppression by the Abyssinian colonizers of Oromiyaa.
I visited Arsi, Baale, Gamu Goofaa, Goojjam, Harar, Kafaa, Shaggar, Sidaamo, Wallaggaa, and Wallo. I did not have to visit Ilu Abbaa Booraa, my birthplace. Due to my own reasons, I could not go to Tigray to interview Raayyaa, Azabo, and Waajiraat Oromos, either. However, I stayed  in Waldiyaa, Wallo, overnight, where I had an opportunity to chat with an elderly Raayyaa Oromo. Despite a minor difference in our pronunciation, kaleesha-kaleessa (yesterday), for instance, we could understand each other very easily. After he told me, with a clear expression of concern on his handsome face, that the younger generation must be taught Afaan Oromo and be urged to use it, he said nagaatti (goodbye) and left. In addition, when I was attending a conference in Nairobi in 1972, I had the opportunity to gauge the situation in Kenya where about half a million Oromos live. After these visits, I concluded that the pronunciation used by Oromos in both Oromiyaa and Kenya is almost identical at the lexical level. The then rampant and alarming rumor that there were wide regional variations in Afaan Oromo, I became convinced, was baseless.

As already stated, I began writing the OED on May 1, 1980, three years after I had witnessed the Red Terror which wreaked havoc on those suspected of having any affiliation with a party whose views were out of favor. I saw corpses lying about in the streets of Finfinne (the city renamed “Addis Ababa” after the colonization of Oromo country). I saw corpses being shoveled out of dump trucks and thrown on the sidewalks for all to see and presumably with the message that they should behave themselves! I saw boys, girls, young old men, and women thrown out of speeding military jeeps and shot dead.

There were two primary reasons for attempting to write this one-man, bilingual dictionary. First, confident that almost everybody in the Empire had cowered in the aftermath of the brutal Red Terror, Mengistu’s dictatorial regime sped up its literacy campaign in the name of socialism and communism. The tacit policy of the campaign was not only to discourage the spread of English but also to thrust the Amharic language down the throats of every nation and nationality in the Ethiopian Empire. The unsuspecting victims of this tacit policy were beguiled into believing that fifteen languages (of the total 80 or so languages in the Empire) were selected and were being used to promote literacy. In my view as a linguist, this position amounted to propaganda. To give credence to its propaganda, the regime allowed the distribution of literature written in the Amharic script in areas where the fifteen languages (representing over 90% of the population) are spoken. The Amharic syllabary, which cannot be adapted to writing the Kushitic languages, was a fiasco. Kushitic people could not crack what appeared as a strange-looking code in which their respective languages were written. In other words, they simply could not understand the reading matter the regime sent to their respective regions. Neither could they cope with learning about 280 Amharic characters as compared to about 35 Latin symbols required to write, if adapted carefully, most Kushitic languages.

The opposition voiced by Kushitic people against the use of the Amharic script was made to appear by the regime’s cadre as resistance against learning their own respective ethnic languages! The regime’s cadre started to report that all the nationalities, including about 30 million Oromos, prefer to learn the Amharic language instead of their own respective languages for practical reasons since Amharic is the official language of the Empire. The implication of this argument was in effect to urge the regime to abandon altogether the policy which I considered specious all along of allowing the use of nationality languages and then declaring openly an “Amharic only” policy. To my mind, this was clearly an attempt to assimilate the non-Amhara groups into Amhara culture.

It is to be remembered also that prior to the eruption of the Ethiopian “revolution” in February 1974, a grade of C in Amharic had been one of the minimum requirements for candidates who wished to join institutions of higher education. Because of this requirement alone, many non-Amhara students had been barred from joining AAU. Obviously, the native Amharic-speaking students had an advantage over the non-Amhara students for whom Amharic was a second language. Even after joining the freshman program of AAU, the non-Amhara students had to overcome another hurdle: they had to pass the required Amharic 101 and 102 courses to remain in the university. More difficult still, some of those who succeeded were forced to join the Education Faculty, major in Amharic (then offered by the Amharic Department), and teach it after graduation. In the heyday of the revolution, the non-Amhara students put up strong resistance and had this arbitrary requirement rescinded. They also managed to have the Amharic Department closed altogether.

However, after the non-Amhara students’ anger had subsided, the regime reinstated the same Amharic Department in a very subtle way. One approach the regime came up with was changing the name “Amharic  Department” to “Ethiopian Languages and Literature Department”. The change, the department declared, was necessary to accommodate the nationality languages. In fact, what it did was to offer, in addition to Amharic, an archaic language called Ge’ez — a language used only in the liturgy of the Coptic Church. Once again, using the misnomer “Ethiopian languages and Literature” as a facade, the department continued to resist the very idea of introducing and teaching any of the nationality languages in the university.

To realize the ambitious plan to eliminate or to cast the other languages into oblivion, the regime made a substantial effort. To further promote Amharic, it decided to discontinue even the use of English as a medium of instruction in the high schools, colleges, and in AAU. The regime’s “revolutionary” cadres started their campaign against English, denouncing it as a “capitalist” language. In Addis Ababa University, a generously funded committee was established to translate science and technology terminology into Amharic. A cadre who overheard me say, “things are going a bit far”, said to me, perchance in jest, “you Englishman, you are not a good Ethiopian!”

All these stratagems were clearly designed to promote Amharic at the expense of the languages of the other nations/nationalities. I could easily see through the regime’s tactics. I was bitter. I thought Afaan Oromo would not be able to endure and that Wallo’s fate was looming up for all Oromiyaa. So, though I had no money for the project I did have interest and determination, and thus I made up my mind to try to save my language from sinking into oblivion by recording at least a part of its vocabulary on paper.

The second reason for my writing the bilingual dictionary was to enrich the English vocabulary of Ororno students through a bilingual dictionary and at the same time enable them see their language in its written form. As stated in the OED itself, I believe that in an environment where contact with the native speakers of English and exposure to their culture is almost nil, the OED is extremely useful. Although some foreign language teachers may frown upon the idea of using bilingual dictionaries to teach a foreign language, it does no harm to tell an Oromo speaker that, for instance, qoru, qoom, qorru, respectively mean to investigate, to dry, and to feel cold.

Regarding the question of what symbols to use to write Afaan Oromo, I had two options. One option was inventing 33 symbols that could represent the 33 Oromo phonemes. After dallying with this idea for a while, I abandoned it because it proved to be impractical. The second option was to adapt any suitable script. Here again, after trying the Amharic syllabary, the Latin, and the International Phonetic alphabets, I concluded that the Latin alphabet is the best of the three for writing Afaan Oromo.
Also, a similar conclusion had been arrived at in the early 1970’s. A group of Oromo scholars in Europe anonymously wrote in 1973 an excellent grammar book titled, Hirmaatadubbii Afaan Oromo: Beekumsi durii jireenya har ‘aatiifakka tolu. As can be seen from this 139-page book, the authors almost perfected the adaptation process for us. They show short/long vowel sounds by single/double vowel letters, respectively, as in busa/buusaa (malaria/fringe), and to indicate gemination, which is phonemic in Afaan Oromo, they use double consonants as in badaa/baddaa (many/highland). So do we today. Perhaps, the only difference is that whereas they use diacritical marks to represent five sounds, we now employ the digraphs ch, dh, ny, ph, sh for the same sounds. Because of this added refinement, it is now possible to use any typewriter or computer that has keys for all the letters of the Latin alphabet and the Arabic numerals. The qubee, the Oromo alphabet in its present form, has now firmly established itself in Oromo culture in spite of the Abyssinian opposition.

The Oromo-English Dictionary (OED): the Writing Process

The work was done in three stages: planning/decision-making, writing, and publication.
Planning/Decision-making Phase

I decided to proceed as follows: to make all the necessary decisions carefully, write them down, and place a reminder, i.e. paper or card on which the decisions are written in a convenient place for easy reference. I was aware that to ensure consistency, lexicographers must stick to their decisions throughout. Changing mind after typing on a manual typewriter, say, 400 pages, can be a costly and time-consuming drudge. Here is an example from my own experience: I discovered that I had made two minor mistakes. One was using three consonant clusters as in /Kur’CCi:/ instead of just two as in /Kur’Ci:/. The second mistake was that I had assumed that there was a shade of difference in length between /a:/ and /a/. However, after typing, using the conventional typewriter since I had no computer then, 307 pages I realized that, in the phonemic transcription part, either /a:/ or /a/, not both, could have been appropriate to represent the long vowel sound. In other words, I should have transcribed, for instance, the present 1 ka:’su: 1 and / kaw’u: 1, either as / ka’su: 1 and / ka’wu: / or as 1 ka:’su: / and / ka:’wu: /consistently. Obviously, it is not difficult to imagine the formidable task of going over 307 pages had I attempted to make the changes!
The first decision I had made before I began writing the OED was to compile a bilingual dictionary that educated Oromos could use. All Oromos educated in Ethiopian schools know at least two other languages besides their own. They can read and write the other two or more languages except, for the most part, their own first language.

Oromos are not illiterates in their own first language by choice. For over one hundred years, the Abyssinians spared no expense to prevent Afaan Oromo from becoming a written language and from being used in schools, in courts, and anywhere near the bureaucracies that have always existed as exclusive clubs to serve the interests of members! They banned both the production and the introduction of any Oromo literature into the Empire. They even burned the Bible for being written in Afaan Oromo. Ironically, the fact that the translator of the Bible, Abbaa Gammachiis, used the Amharic syllabary, which Abyssinians consider sacred, did not save him from cruel harassment and witch-hunts! They hunted down Shaykh Bakri Saplo, who died mysteriously in exile because he tried to invent an alphabet for writing Afaan Oromo. It is my view that if such harsh measures had not been applied, no Oromo would have chosen to remain illiterate in their own mother tongue.

My second major decision before starting writing the OED had to do with the number of entries and the dialect to be included. I decided to include all the words and morphemes in the language. Dictionary writing can be a very difficult undertaking for one person. Dealing with, say, ten thousand entries is like working on ten thousand projects, not just one project. I tackled it without the benefit of the computer and financial assistance. So, if once in a while, one cannot find in OED what one considers a household word, it is understandable and, in due course, rectifiable.

The words came from my own store of vocabulary, from the scanty literature available at the time, from radio broadcasts, and from conversations. After coming across an unfamiliar word, I made it a point to meet or telephone at least five persons to clarify its meaning before entering it in the dictionary. Obviously, I did not always expect an accurate definition; it was enough if they uttered the word and its collocation. For instance, I remember asking a man if he knew the meaning of (h)imimsu (to snort). Somewhat surprised at my ignorance, he answered my question with a question: “Maal, (h)imimsu jechuun maal akka ta’e himbeektanuu? Imimsu jechuun imimsu dhuma kaa! Farda malee ammo maaltu himimsa?” (How come you don’t know what himimsu means? Himimsu means himimsu, it’s that simple! Besides, what else snorts except a horse?).

What about foreign words that have firmly established themselves in the language after being adopted, adapted, or translated? Certainly, words like kootii (adoption of the English word ‘coat’), rophilaanii (adaptation of ‘airplane’), abbaa buddeenaa (probably translation of ‘ye injeraa abbaat’ which in Amharic literally means ‘father of bread’, step-father) cannot be ignored by a lexicographer whose responsibility is to record words as objectively as possible.

In fact, I would like to propose that we Oromos encourage judicious adoption and adaptation of technical and scientific terms. New commodities and concepts are introduced along with the jargon terms by which they are identified in the country of their origin. The word ‘sputnik’, the name for the machine the then Soviet Union made to orbit the earth in 1957, is adopted and used in the English language today. Regarding dialect, I made it a point not to mention. In an environment where antagonists were looking for every opportunity to divide the Oromo people, I did not want to give them a weapon, a wedge to be put between us. There is no need for using labels such as “Tuulamaa” or “Maccaa” dialect. I adopted the position that an Oromo word used anywhere is a property of all Oromos everywhere. It is a treasury that we Oromos all fall back on when we talk or write on topics such as administration, arts, and sciences, business, diplomacy, judiciary, politics, science, and technology, etc.

Pertaining to standardization, some Oromos have started talking about the need for resolving this important issue as soon as possible. I believe that the issue can wait until at least two prime requirements are met. First, we have to collect all the linguistic data from all over Oromiyaa and understand what the differences actually are. Some minor differences that could exist, for example, in terms of what words mean and how they are pronounced in different parts of the nation, must be identified and analyzed scientifically. Doing the job well requires time, patience, dedication, money, and material resources.

The second important prerequisite for standardization is autonomy/self-determination. When Oromos themselves begin to administer the affairs of Oromiyaa, they will develop Afaan Oromo as they see it fit, not on the basis of the directives that are sent down to them from ” ye belaay akaal” (the higher echelon), the invisible decision-maker from the corridors of power. As a language at work, Afaan Oromo will of necessity standardize itself. Standardization is already in motion. For instance, when I was writing the OED, not only were there different names of the months but also there were contradictory versions of the order in which they were cited. The present edition of the OED reflects that confusion. The OLF calendar has now standardized the names of the months for us, and we are able to say, off the top of our head: Amajjii, Guraandbala, Bitootessa, Caamsaa, Ebla, Waxabajjii, Adoolessa, Hagayya, Birraa, Onkoloolessa, Saddaasa, and Arfaasaa (January to December), in that order.

Finally, the most politically sensitive decision I made was to use the Latin alphabet instead of the Amharic syllabary. Because of this and the decision to abandon (for being cumbersome and expensive) the projected “Amharic-Oromo-English Dictionary”, the first typed draft of the OED was caught up in Abyssinian politics. Even though I deliberately avoided using the standard Oromo spelling we now use because it is identified with the OLF, the decision got me into all sorts of problems. I was harangued almost everywhere: in my office, in the corridors, and in the staff lounge. The bureaucracy got tougher with me and used any pretext to at least delay the publication of the work. After the bureaucrats got copies of the first draft, my occupation became thinking of the most effective, diplomatic way of answering their frequently asked questions, ” Why the Latin alphabet? Why not the Amharic alphabet? Why the OED? Why not OAD or AOD, i.e. Oromo-Amharic Dictionary or Amharic-Oromo Dictionary? Why a bilingual dictionary? Why not just an Amharic or Oromo dictionary?” As it will be clearer later on in this paper, the tactics of asking irrelevant questions and of setting up a committee of inquiry worked to delay publication. It took five more years for the work to be published, i.e. between the completion of the first draft in 1984 and its publication in 1989!

Writing Phase

A brief discussion of the irony of an event that actually facilitated the writing of the OED is in order here. I was the Dean of the Education Faculty, AAU, when the president of the university (an economist), the vice president (a lawyer), and the Dean of the Social Sciences Faculty (a geographer), met secretly (probably in 1977) and wrote a controversial proposal which in effect dismantled the Education Faculty. Without consulting any member from the Education Faculty, the trio of University bureaucrats, agents of the regime themselves, proposed that most of the major departments under the Education Faculty should be transferred to the Natural Sciences and Social Sciences Faculties. As might be expected, all the members of the Education Faculty, except one whom I considered a renegade, were diametrically opposed to the proposal. I was accused of inciting the members against the university administration, a dangerous precedent in a “communist” Ethiopia, I was warned.

That was the time (sometime in 1977) when the regime was labeling Oromos with phrases such as “Right Roaders” and “Narrow Nationalists”. When I arrived at my office one morning, I saw three large posters hanging on the walls close to the door of my office and a woman standing in front of it.  On one of the posters was written, in large letters and in red ink, the sentence,”Xabbaab bihertanyochi innaa qanyi mangadanyoch yi wadimaallu!” (Narrow Nationalists and Right Roaders shall be annihilated!) Whether her presence was by design or by coincidence I am not sure, the woman said in Amharic and with an affected voice choked with emotion, “Oh! How glad I am to see you! My husband, who was one of your students, and I were crying all night because we heard that you died!” I thanked her for her concern and said,” As you can see for yourself, I am still alive.”

The same day, the man I referred to above as a “renegade,” whom I helped to join the Education Faculty after he had been dismissed from the Ministry of Education, came to my office and gave me a great deal of advice on how to work with the bureaucrats smoothly. Of the many things he emphasized, I always remember the saying with which he concluded his diatribe. It goes like this: ” Sittaazzi inda geetaa; sittittaazzaz inda baariyaa” siibbaal alsammaahim? (Haven’t you heard the Amharic saying, “When you order, pose like a master; when you are given orders by your superior, you must cringe and obey like a slave?”) To my mind, this misguided philosophy is one of the core problems of Abyssinian bureaucracy, which functions as an exclusive club. The person stationed at every level of the bureaucratic hierarchy takes the hint that he/she is entitled to be approached with servile obedience and adulation by those who are in the lower echelon. The existence of a law, no matter how nominal, does not matter to the bureaucrat who is usually a law unto himself/herself. Because of this mentality, there is not much that one can claim as right unless the bureaucrat’s malkaam faqaad (graciousness) is secured. Nor is there a pleasant atmosphere conducive to genuine, democratic discussions between the bureaucrats above and below.

Frankly, that morning, I was distraught with worry because of the posters, the woman’s mention of my “death,” and the renegade’s diatribe. In the afternoon of the same day, the Vice President asked me to arrange a staff meeting of the Faculty for the next day. At the meeting, a heated argument ensued. All the members but the renegade insisted that the courses (Biology, Chemistry, Mathematics, Physics, Amharic, English, History, Geography) that had been so meticulously designed, and over the years, had proved to be very effective for would-be high school teachers and should remain under the Education Faculty. The vice president, the regime’s loyal cadre, did not agree. To make matters worse, he added Educational Psychology to the list of courses that should be removed from the Education Faculty. He also shut down Prince Beide Mariam School, the Faculty’s laboratory where students had done their practice teaching. After the meeting, he told me that he had no problem with my ability as a whole and said that all the same, it would be better if I stayed away from any administrative activities at least for as long as he, the leader of the moment, wielded the power. He was true to his word: he relieved me of all my administrative duties and transferred me to the Institute of Language Studies (ILS).

That transfer was a blessing in disguise for me because writing the OED as a member of the ILS was more justifiable than writing it as a member of the Education Faculty. Besides, since I had been barred from administrative responsibilities at the ILS, I was able to concentrate, after teaching the required maximum of 12 hours a week, on my project during my free hours at night and on weekends. As a result, I completed writing the work in the summer of 1984.

The Publication Phase

Sometime in 1984, I gave the completed draft to the AAU Research and Publications Office (RPO) for assessment. According to AAU rules and regulations, any work submitted for publication must be assessed by two anonymous, external reviewers who must also be at least one academic rank higher than the author of a work to be published. The two reviewers lauded the work and strongly recommended that it be published. However, one of them asked, genuinely and out of curiosity, why the Latin alphabet was used instead of the Amharic script. Gradually, this question gathered momentum and became a cause into which almost every Abyssinian staff of AAU threw their heart and soul. Surprisingly, while conducting my father-in-law’s funeral service, even the priest, suddenly, out of the blue said, “ahunimmaa woromo dikshinarii tatsifowaal yibbaalaal!” (It is said that even an Oromo dictionary has already been written nowadays!). The comment about an Oromo dictionary was so unrelated and inappropriate to the occasion that even the most anti-Oromo Abyssinians present were embarrassed.

Since the OED was not Amharic but was Afaan Oromo, a language that is condemned to death, it must be assessed again. I can imagine what a bureaucrat might have said to the RPO people, “More reviewers, not just two, must be involved in scrutinizing this controversial work.” I believe that due to the pressure coming from higher up, the Office went against its own rules and had the OED reviewed again by three more persons. Apparently, this time the work was sent to reviewers who must have been handpicked because all of them literally called me names for using the Latin alphabet. Among other things, they labeled me a chauvinist intellectual, a narrow nationalist, an enemy of Ethiopian unity, and of the Amharic script. One detected a single misspelled word in the “Introduction” to the OED and concluded that I was not fit to be an English teacher! Amazingly though, they, too, still recommended that the work should be published.

Using diplomatic language, I tried to prove my innocence. I assured all concerned that the OED was only a scientific endeavor and that I was not out to destroy the Amharic script. To prove the point that I do not hate the Amharic syllabary and to allay their fears, 1 wrote an article titled “Ye Beet Siraa” (Homework) in Amharic and had it published in a party-sponsored education journal. Incidentally, for this article, I was sent a check for 150 Birr (US$30). In addition, in a paper I presented in Finfinne at the International Conference on Ethiopian Studies, I tried to convince all concerned that the Latin alphabet was selected specifically for the purpose of writing the OED and that it was not an endorsement of its use in general.

After the conference, some participants, mostly Kushitic scholars from Europe, U.S.A., the then USSR, and Asia, expressed their support for and interest in the work. Very shortly, a publishing company in Germany wrote me a letter in which it promised that it was ready to publish the OED at no cost to me.

At every opportunity, I  capitalized upon this letter. I started to appeal to the ego, prejudices, and fears of AAU bureaucrats. I argued that instead of giving away its work to a German publishing company, an autonomous university, whose purpose is to enhance teaching and research, should welcome works such as an OED and publish it itself. If published in Finfinne, the relatively low cost of publication would make the work affordable in Ethiopia. Besides, not only can the university earn money by producing and selling the work in bulk, but also the Amharic-speaking governors deployed all over Oromiyaa, could use the work for checking their interpreters. More importantly, it is good politics for the Ethiopian government whose very public policy at the time was its commitment to “developing” the nationality languages!

These proffered reasons started to produce positive results. I was even advised to submit the letter from Germany together with the OED draft and request the university Senate to promote me from the rank of Assistant Professor to that of the Associate Professor. I got my promotion, although some thought that I should have saved the OED for a promotion to the rank of Professor. One able member of the Senate, a professor, first congratulated me and then jokingly said, “When playing rummy, people never throw away their jokers! Few short articles would have been enough for the promotion to the rank of Associate Professor.” I laughed, but I did not tell him that my greatest ambition was not to get the rank or money but to see the OED published. Another positive result was, except for the staunch conservatives, many stopped opposing the publication of the work.

Actually, in my opinion, the main reason for the ebbing away of opposition was the involvement of the Dean of the ILS at the time. Practically every member of AAU was in awe of the Dean, not only because he was the representative of the Party and a man often seen on TV sitting beside Mengistu, but also because he was in charge of all AAU political affairs. After going over the draft, he said that the OED must be published and that any opposition to this worthwhile work should be silenced. Definitely, there was a temporary respite after the Dean’s position became clear. To my great surprise, even “Reasons for Choosing the Latin Alphabet for Writing Afaan Oromo”, a paper prepared for the Conference on Ethiopian Studies to be held in Moscow, was accepted.

Unfortunately, that relatively calm, opposition-free period was short-lived. At the Conference in Moscow, there was an attempt to sabotage my presentation. In the program, one that had been prepared in Finfinne and distributed in Moscow, the words in the title of my paper were so jumbled that the title did not make any sense whatsoever. I suspected that was deliberately done to embarrass me and discourage attendance. But a large audience turned out in spite of the misprinted announcement that had appeared in the Conference program. Before I started my presentation, I requested that the participants correct the title of my paper. Although 1 was told I was free to use the whole afternoon, I wound up my presentation in one hour and opened the forum for discussion. A group of about four conservative Abyssinians who were occupying the front seats started to warm up to the familiar theme that writing Afaan Oromo in Latin alphabet cannot be justified. They took it in turn to repeat the same timeworn question, “Why the Latin alphabet, why not the Amharic syllabary?” One of them said with an air of authority something like, ” In making the decision to use the Latin alphabet you have taken only linguistic considerations into account, but what is more important to us is the political decision!” After this verdict, some questions flashed through my mind: “As a researcher, don’t I have the right to choose and use any symbol for writing my language? Why do the Abyssinian bureaucrats have to make that choice for me?” At that moment I realized that their decision to block the publication of the OED was nothing but a mere playful pinch in comparison to the heavy blows targeted against Oromos who struggle to throw off conditions of oppression: imprisonment, torture, expropriation, and death. When my mind flashed back to the plight of Oromos in general, I lost my composure and even burst into tears. One of the participants, a Russian, grabbed the microphone, singled out the director of the Institute of Ethiopian Studies (IES), and confronted him with a rhetorical question, “Being the Director of the IES, how come you don’t appreciate this work?” The chairman of the session suggested that we should take a break.

When we returned, I found the hecklers’ seats empty. I was glad that the group had absented itself because it became possible for the other participants to objectively discuss both the content and the form of the OED. Some wanted to know if the sounds represented by the international phonetic symbols / (,(,( / do in fact exist in Afaan Oromo. One who had not seen the draft asked if warraaqsa (revolution) was entered or not. I enjoyed answering such questions to the same extent that I had hated hammering the reasons for choosing the Latin alphabet into the heads of people who appeared impervious to reason. It is my experience that Abyssinian bureaucrats never acknowledge the justice of an Oromo cause. Even when a daring disputant comers them with indisputable facts, the bureaucrats frequently respond by merely snapping, “biihoonim, biihoonim, biihoonim …” (even then, even then, even then…). 

At the Plenary Session, the spokesman for the Linguistics Section, a highly respected American scholar, turned the table on the opponents of the OED. After giving the summary of each paper on linguistics, he finally announced that the committee had voted the OED to be cited as the magnum opus at the Plenary Session. I was completely vindicated, and naturally, I was also exhilarated. Henceforth, I thought, the enemies of the OED would be forced to capitulate.

On arriving in Finfinne, however, I observed some signs indicating clearly that my opponents had not relented. First, they omitted my name and the title of my presentation from the AAU News and Events Bulletin which appeared with the list of “Ethiopian scholars” who came back safely after presenting scholarly papers at the Conference on Ethiopian Studies held in Moscow. The omission could not have been an oversight because the media would usually blare out any news of success. Second, even colleagues at the university who had been giving me at least a stiff smile started to give me the cold shoulder and to ignore me altogether. Third, one student of mine who had been a party cadre before joining AAU, told me that the OED was mentioned at a Politburo meeting and labeled as a work written in disguised OLF script. The situation I was in was very tense indeed. Under the circumstances, though, all I could do was to follow the Oromo maxim ” karaa cabe haa yaa’u” (let it run its course) and wait calmly for all eventualities.

The eventualities I had expected were (1) the banning of the OED, (2) loss of my job, (3) imprisonment, or even (4) death. Luckily, none of these happened. Instead, the RPO people asked me to defend the work in the presence of its Research and Publications Subcommittee established by the University Senate to assess the work. I pointed out tremulously (for by then I was almost on the verge of being broken) that I had already convinced six reviewers and defended the work at two international conferences on Ethiopian Studies. The curt reply was “No, you must convince the subcommittee members; their decision is crucial because they are experts in matters of linguistics.” Actually, only one of them was a linguist.

The Subcommittee reminded me, from my reading, of the Inquisition or the Holy Office! Most of the members had been the very persons who had been openly condemning the work. Three of them had already heckled me in Moscow. What could I expect from them? Whatever the outcome, I thought, it would be better to answer every question they might ask as politely as possible without reasoning with them. As I had anticipated, each of them started to raise primarily questions of political nature. In addition to the oft-repeated question, “Why Latin, why not Amharic syllabary”, one of them also asked me why I had not included a bibliography! To avoid embarrassing him, I refrained from saying that I have never seen a bibliography at the end of a dictionary. My plan to compose myself worked. Everybody, including the university’s guru in matters of linguistics, was positively impressed by my obsequious behavior.

Sometime after the interrogation, I was instructed to omit, among other things, the statement “The present estimate of Oromo population in Ethiopia is 19 million”. I complied and after all the changes and the omissions were made, the work was accepted for publication. Henceforth, a part of my job became shuttling between my office and the office of the general services that provides AAU printing house with stationery. That shuttling alone lasted about two years because I was told, the ship that was supposed to bring the stationery from abroad arrived much later than usual.

To my mind, it was worth going through the ordeal of the red tape because the work was published at last. When about 1000 copies were brought to AAU Bookstore in October 1990, mostly Oromo students in the university and other Oromos queued up for copies at 30-birr each. The book eventually sold for about 300 Birr (US$60) a copy outside Finfinne. I learned that the demand was so great that the bookstore had to ration customers to one copy a person. The university received 90% of the book price for printing the work whereas my share was lo%, an arrangement I agreed to because making money was not my goal in writing the OED.

The intense love the Oromo people have for their language surprised even me. Persons who had been hiding their Oromo identities came out of their shells – shells that had never fully protected them from Amharas who appear to me as exceptionally gifted at scrutinizing and identifying a non-Amhara no matter how hard one tries to pass as an Amhara. Some users of the OED expressed their appreciation through gifts, letters, and positive comments. For instance, although I did not send him a copy, Professor Baxter sent me a handwritten note in which he said, “Thank you for putting this pearl in my hand”. One enthusiast made me laugh when he said to me, “You know, after going over the OED I realised that Afaan Oromo, too, has eight parts of speech just like Amharic and English.” A medical professor at the Black Lion Hospital, an Englishman, also made me laugh when he said, ” I didn’t thank you as soon as I got a copy of the OED because first I wanted to check the accuracy of the entries I had sampled. Selected Oromos who live on the outskirts of Finfinne helped me with my project. You are okay.”

My own observation and experience has led me to conclude that it is this kind of burning interest that the Abyssinian bureaucrats have striven to extinguish from the hearts of Oromos. It does not seem to matter to them if Afaan Oromo, the language of 50% of about 60 million people living in Ethiopia is obliterated, as long as Amharic, the traditional palace language, reigns. Their futile attempt to undermine 80 or so languages in the country has always been under the pretext of saving “Ethiopian unity,” a euphemism for forced assimilation of other nationalities into Amhara culture. The custodians of “Ethiopian unity,” however, have fashioned governments that operated as exclusive clubs. Each successive form, whether it was absolute monarchy or socialism/communism/democracy has targeted the Oromos. The “club” mentality produced members who would even stoop to condemn an apolitical writer of a dictionary, as “anti-Ethiopian unity”. One colleague of mine, an Englishman, bluntly told a vociferous group in the AAU staff-lounge at the Sidist Kilo campus, that if one dictionary could divide Ethiopia so easily, the country had never been united!

I offer my account of the difficulty I faced in having my Oromo-English Dictionaiy written and published in Ethiopia between 1980 and 1990 because it sheds some light on the kind of processes of control and intimidation that were in operation against the Oromos in that country. My experience reveals that Abyssinian bureaucrats went to great lengths to keep Oromos under close scrutiny and provides an example of the effort to undermine our legacies-language, culture, and history. The OED, in the words of one reviewer “a singular contribution to Oromo Studies,” did not escape such scrutiny. 

*Dr. Tilahun Gamta is a prominent scholar and educator who has dedicated his professional life to the development and advancement of the Oromo language.

(A4O, 31 July 2020) Col Abiy Ahmed staged a meeting with some junior opposition parties on 29 July 2020 in Finfinnee, Oromia.

Col Abiy Ahmed claimed that they have agreed to continue the discussion on various national issues in platforms that will bring political parties together, with an upcoming dialogue platform on ‘National Consensus.’

One wonder, dialogue with who? You can’t have a national dialogue while jailing critical stakeholders on the future of the nation.

All those politically jailed individuals are the critical heavyweight stakeholders.

The Prime Minister must understand that he does not have a democratic mandate to do a lot of things he is doing.

Transitioning the country needs an honest and authentic collaboration and discussions between relevant opposition parties and the current administration which its legitimacy will end this month of August.

(A4O, 31 July 2020) OLF Chairman, Mr Dawud Ibsaa is back to his Office in Gullalle today.

A4O confirms that the Oromo’s lifelong freedom fighter and the OLF chairman, Dawud Ibsa is back to his office today nearly after two weeks under siege at his residence.

Local sources have reported that Mr Ibsa’s property is also under siege by Ethiopian security forces, while his telephone line has been completely disconnected.

Moreover, government security vehicles have been seen driving in and out of the compound of OLF headquarter in the Gullalle sub district of Finfinnee for the last two weeks.

Members of Oromo community and human rights defendersin Oromia and in the Diaspora have strongly denounced the house arrest of the OLF’s Chairman, Mr Dawud Ibsa.

In the aftermath of the assassination of Oromo’s beloved artist Hacaaluu Hundessaa, members of Ethiopia’s armed forces deployed throughout Oromia have crackdown on anyone accused of being a member or supporter of the OLF.

Numerous Oromo’s high profile politicians including Obbo Bekele Gerba, Obbo Jawar Mohammed, OLF leadership including Abdi Ragassa (for over 2 months), Michael Boran, Dr Shigut Geleta, Lemi Benya, Kenessa Ayana, and Colonel Gemechu Ayana are detained without due process following Hacaalu’s assassination.

Currently, senior leaders of the organisation are detained without due process, including UNPO Presidency Member Dr Shigut Geleta.

Moreover, over 15,000 Oromo civilians are unlawfully incarcerated and the entire Oromia is made a war zone.

OLF chairman Dawud Ibsa was placed under house arrest on 25 July 2020.

By Arne Wulff, Emelie Braun, July 29, 2020

Source: Germany (Konrad Adenauer Stiftung) 

The Democratization Of Ethiopia On A Fine Line Between Success And Failure

Parliamentary elections were supposed to be held in Ethiopia in August 2020. But in view of the Corona pandemic, these have been postponed indefinitely. Thus, the question of democratic legitimacy for Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed Ali’s ambitious reform policy remains outstanding. True, the reforms that have begun seem to have put the country on the right track in many ways – and they are receiving a lot of international support and support. But, however promising the projects may be, the country continues to face major challenges.

In addition to the peace with Eritrea, the continuation of democratization and the fight against high poverty, this concerns above all the continuing strong ethnic tensions. Most recently, these escalated again when violent clashes broke out in the wake of the assassination of a popular Oromo singer, in which more than 200 people died. Ethiopia is at a crossroads: is Abiy succeeding not only in opening up the country, but also at one another? Or does its failure threaten the nation’s disintegration?

Early laurels for the hopeful

Since Prime Minister Abiy took office, he has worked his plans to reform the country – not only domestically, but also with regard to external relations. In the summer of 2018, just a few months after taking office, neighboring Eritrea signed a peace agreement that, after decades of hostility, was supposed to normalize the relationship between the two countries – starting with the opening of borders. In foreign policy, Abiy also acts as a peace broker in the region, for example in the maritime dispute between Kenya and Somalia and in the commitment to a peaceful transition of power in Sudan. In December 2019, Abiy was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, in particular because of the peace deal with Eritrea. Many wondered if the award ceremony was not too early. The border with Eritrea has since been closed again, and Ethiopia’s transition to democracy is on a fine line between success and failure.

The ever-increasing ethnic tensions with a large number of deaths threaten to jeopardize the country’s progress. Democratizing a multi-ethnic state like Ethiopia with more than 80 different ethnic groups while at the same time peacefully unifying it is a mammoth task. For more than 30 years, Ethiopia was ruled by a socialist, repressive regime, dubbed by some as a “development dictatorship.” Ethiopia was a long way from true democracy until the political upheaval of 2018. To date, the opposition, the press and civil society have been severely repressed. Opposition candidates and their supporters were intimidated, political opponents were deliberately denied ballot papers, and voter fraud was commonplace. Abiy is committed to changing this. But his reform course seems to have stalled, and in the context of current developments, skeptical voices are growing – and with it, the fear of the consequences of a failure of the reform agenda is growing.

The political upheaval

Ethiopia is experiencing a political upheaval under Abiy with the potential to set the course for sustainable democratic development. The upheaval was the result of ongoing protests against the previous government, which began in 2015 and culminated in 2018. People took to the streets mainly because of the unequal balance of power. The anger was directed in particular at the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), which represents only a small part of the Ethiopian people ethnically, but dominated the ruling coalition of the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF). More and more, many Ethiopians rebelled against the oppression of ethnic minorities and political opponents and were willing to fight for the right to freedom of expression and freedom of the press.

Added to this was growing economic dissatisfaction against the background that few benefited from Ethiopia’s economic boom. Hundreds of people were killed in these protests. Former Prime Minister Hailemariam Desalegn finally resigned in February 2018, and Science Minister Dr. Abiy Ahmed Ali was elected as his successor a short time later. As a result, many representatives of the old regime were replaced, and the new president became a woman with the experienced diplomat Sahle-Work Zewde for the first time in the country’s history.

Ambitious reform course

After Prime Minister Abiy came to power in the spring of 2018, he initiated profound changes. Especially in his course of democratization and reform, he surprised with his courage in rapid reforms, some of which had already been implemented and which included, above all, the following innovations:

• The opening up of the multi-party system
• The commitment to freedom of expression and freedom of the press
• Lifting the strict blockades of the press and the Internet
• Review of media legislation
• Easing strict rules for NGOs
• The release of political prisoners and invitation to exiles to return to Ethiopia
• Liberalization and industrialization of the country
• Market economy opening (instead of the previously strictly state-regulated economy)
• Privatization of state-owned enterprises
• Gender equality
• Filling important positions with women
• Important changes at management level
• A comprehensive reform of the judicial system
• The peace agreement with Eritrea.

“The centrifugal power of liberalization”

The Prime Minister’s reform ambitions are undoubtedly promising and have been very popular from the outset. But they also face significant risks and numerous obstacles. Perhaps the greatest challenge, despite liberalization, is to ensure the cohesion of the people and to avoid fragmentation of the country. Because there are still strong ethnic tensions and conflicts within the population. To date, these have been nipped in the bud by arresting and isolating government opponents. But the new political freedom that has been won risks ethnic groups pursue regional autonomy and the ambitious prime minister slips away from political control. Many of the ethnic groups do not feel equal or adequately represented.

Although the Oromo ethnic group is the largest in the country with 34 percent, the Amhars (27%) dominate and the Tigray (6%) political life. With Abiy, an Oromo (in fact, his father Oromo, but his mother Amhare) came to power for the first time, but according to his own information – probably also against the background of his mixed lineage – he sees himself as an Ethiopian and not as a representative of a certain ethnic group. As much as this self-image characterizes him, it seems difficult for him to integrate the Oromo, whose anger stems from more than a hundred years of political oppression, into a policy of national unity without ethnic patronage or preference.

The desire of this ethnic group in particular for more autonomy and political influence is gaining momentum and seems to be breaking ground in the course of the newly gained freedoms, even on threatening paths. In the first year and a half after the new prime minister took office alone, more people are said to have been victims of politically motivated violence than at the time of the riots before. Abiy’s idea of liberalizing and democratizing the ethnically divided country, on the one hand, and as a nation on the other, is a ride on the razor blade. If he succeeds in this step without violence, he could go down in history as a trailblazer for a new Ethiopia. If, on the other hand, he fails, the disintegration of the state and the violence that accompanies it could be hard to stop. The political art of the Prime Minister will have to be to steer the ethnic centrifugal forces of liberalization in the direction of a sense of common belonging. Doubts are growing as to whether this can really succeed.

Challenges and dangers of current developments

However, these are not the only challenges facing the government. The weak institutional capacity makes it difficult to implement the reform projects. It is also problematic that many positions of the government apparatus continue to be made up of people from the old repressive regime. Their loyalty to the new course seems dubious.The country’s industrialization and infrastructure improvement are high on Abiy’s reform agenda.

In return, the country has accumulated enormous debt in the past: the national debt amounts to USD 52.57 billion (of which USD 26.05 billion is external government debt). [1] This is about 66 percent of gross domestic product (the average sub-Saharan Africa is about 57 percent of GDP[2]). Ethiopia is particularly indebted to China. This has led to dependencies that could strain the course of reform. This is one of the reasons why the new government is seeking greater ties with Europe, the US and the Arab states. It is clear that Ethiopia can no longer afford greater debt. Instead, Abiy must focus on attracting foreign investors.

In principle, Ethiopia has the potential for an attractive growth market and, above all, the rapidly developing industrial sector offers many opportunities. But it remains questionable whether economic transformation can keep up with high population growth and whether sustainable economic prospects emerge for the majority of the population. Economic and political transformation are interdependent. The necessary investment requires political stability and reliable constitutional structures. At the same time, acceptance of the course of political reform can probably only be guaranteed if the economic situation is positively perceived. [3]Although some successes and progress are already clear, the mood of the Ethiopians is only partially optimistic.

Because of their historically poor experience with political leadership, popular impatience is on the increase. The small successes do not always seem to be perceived and appreciated at home. Many are already lamenting, after only two years, the slowness of reforms and the lack of jobs and career prospects. The pressure on Abiy to translate his visionary announcements into tangible successes is thus growing. The fact that, in these times, the Corona pandemic is bringing public life to a virtual standstill is likely to prove to be another obstacle for the Prime Minister.

The planned elections in 2020 and the Corona pandemic

The first truly democratic elections in Ethiopia have so far failed to take a good turn. Parliamentary elections were originally scheduled to take place in May 2020. At the beginning of the year, they were postponed to 29 August 2020. The reason for this was the too short preparation time for the National Electoral Commission in view of the necessary voter registration and efforts by politicians to regroup in the course of liberalization in the form of new political parties and possible coalition alliances. While the EPRDF still has all 547 seats in parliament, other parties and party alliances now have the opportunity to come to power or participate politically through democratic elections in Ethiopia.

The holding of general, equal and free elections is extremely important for the democratic legitimacy of the Prime Minister. Only then can he succeed in continuing his reform course. In order to reinforce this, he has also worked hard to free himself from old party alliances such as the EPRDF and to form a new party. The Ethiopian Prosperity Party (EPP) is to stand for the political goals of the Prime Minister in the future and pursues above all an economically liberal programmatics. However, the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF), formerly dominant of the EPRDF, has chosen not to join the new party. Overall, the political opposition in the country, which exists in particular in the Oromo and Tigray ethnic groups, deplores not being involved in politics. They feel increasingly excluded from the transformation of Ethiopia into a true democracy promised by Prime Minister Abiy.

The prolonged pause in political competition, now prescribed in the light of the Corona pandemic, further increases frustration. The course of democratic renewal through elections is interrupted for the time being. After the first Covid-19 case was registered on 12 March, the general election, now scheduled for August, was postponed again – this time for an indefinite period[4].Ethiopia now has more than 14,500 infected people and more than 200 deaths (as of 28.07.2020). However, it is assumed that the number of unreported cases is much higher, as there is little testing capacity in the country. And although the number of infections seems quite low compared to other countries such as South Africa (over 450,000 cases, as of 28.07.2020), it has to be noted that the treatment capacities (according to the government about 1,500 intensive care beds and about 400 artificial ventilation options) are very low, at least for seriously ill people, and are now at their limits.

The situation is particularly critical in Addis Ababa. In addition, as a result of the brain drain, many well-trained Ethiopian doctors work abroad for the benefit of earning opportunities. Qualified staff to treat Covid-19 are available to a limited extent.As early as 8 April 2020, Abiy declared a national emergency for an initial period of five months, which is associated with a number of restrictions. Among other things, land borders were closed, more than four people had gathered, schools and educational institutions were closed, travel restrictions were imposed in the country and strict quarantine regulations were imposed, and an obligation to wear masks in public spaces was introduced.Politically, the rescheduling of the elections weighs heavily on the government – this is already the second far-off in six months.

In addition, the parliamentary term, and thus the government’s term of office in the summer of 2020, will end constitutionally under normal circumstances. The forthcoming elections are so crucial for Ethiopia and its future, because these elections set the course for the country’s further development; they are to be regarded as a ‘democratic premiere’. Whether the country will continue to pursue Abiy’s ambitious reform plans, and whether it continues to move toward liberalization and democracy, depends largely on these elections. They serve to give democratic legitimacy to the Prime Minister and his reform plans and are therefore seen as a test.

Artist’s murder sparks unrest

On June 29, 2020, singer and activist Hachalu Hundessa was gunned down in Addis Ababa and succumbed to his injuries a short time later. Hachalu belonged to the Oromo ethnic group and was celebrated in his homeland as a voice of protest. His songs are closely linked to the protests between 2015 and 2018 that led to the resignation of Abiy’s predecessor. In the aftermath of his assassination, violent clashes broke out between demonstrators and security forces in the capital Addis Ababa and in the state of Oromia. They were accompanied by roadblocks, several explosions in Addis Ababa, burning cars, smashed windows and looting.

Over two weeks, Internet connections in the Addis Ababa area were shut down and telephone calls were also blocked. Many people were killed in the riots: according to the police, there were at least 239 dead. The government reacted with a hard hand, arresting opposition figures, including the well-known Oromo nationalist Jawar Mohammed. The charges against him include involvement in the murder of a police officer during the riots. His supporters deny this and accuse Abiy of trying to get rid of a political opponent by arresting Jawar. The Oromia Media Network (OMN), founded by Jawar, was also closed. Meanwhile, two suspects were arrested, who eventually confessed to being involved in Hachalu’s murder. According to the Ethiopian Prosecutor General’s Office, the act was part of a conspiracy to overthrow the government.

Further background remains unclear.These recent events show how fragile the situation in the country is and the risk of escalating political and ethnic tensions. It is also striking that, in the face of the unrest, Prime Minister Abiy apparently used the same instruments as his political predecessors: shutting down all communication facilities and arresting opponents. Observers condemned the government’s response to the protests and unrest as excessive and counterproductive. They are in stark contrast to Abiy’s much-maintained image as a liberal reformer. There are now growing fears that a larger oromo protest movement could occur again. The developments strain the Oromo’s already tense relationship with the government and strengthen a mistrust of Abyi. Critics from his own ethnic group have long accused the prime minister of not doing enough to protect the interests of his home region.

View

Given the expiry of democratic legitimacy of the Ethiopian Parliament and the Abiy government, as well as the elections postponed indefinitely, political instability in the country is expected to continue. The existing ethnic conflicts have not yet been resolved by the new government. If elections had taken place in August, Abiy would probably have been confirmed as Prime Minister by Parliament as a result. Whether this will also be the case if the elections do not take place until 2021 or, at worst, 2022, is increasingly questionable.So Ethiopia’s future remains uncertain. The horn of Africa country has enormous potential, but it cannot be called up without further reforms.

Right now, positive developments, visible above all to the population, would be necessary – developments that benefit all ethnic groups. At the political level, the question also arises as to how the present and future governments can pursue the desire of the regions for greater autonomy, in order, on the one hand, to preserve national peace and, on the other, not to jeopardize national unity. A redefinition of ethnic federalism is envisaged, in which Germany could provide support and advice with its federalist expertise. At the economic level, the country’s goal is to sustainably secure and expand the economic recovery that has been going on for years, with growth rates of between nine and ten percent per year.

First and foremost, the individual citizen and his education and social position should be in the foreground. The issues of gender equality, ethnic inclusion and the scope and quality of education will determine Ethiopia’s future. At the same time, unemployment must be removed and employment and infrastructure developed in parallel with the problem of a rapidly growing young population. This requires further financial resources and programms, as well as the recruitment of investors. However, borrowing further, especially from China, seems dangerous and should be avoided in order to avoid even greater debt and dependence on the country. To make matters worse, the Corona pandemic will set the entire global economy – and African countries in particular – back for years to come.

There are two alternative scenarios for the future of the country. On the one hand, an optimistic future scenario, in which an inclusive policy change takes place, followed by further economic growth, internal and external peace and the improvement of living conditions. On the other hand, there is also a pessimistic future scenario in which the country could experience an abrupt end to political stability and the disintegration of the state order, with the result that dictatorial forces once again seize power. At the moment, it is not possible to say which scenario is more likely.

All the more reason for the democratic states of the world to give political support to the path of democratization taken by Abiy Ahmed and to help the country economically. It is also a question of strengthening all democratic forces in the country. Abiy Ahmed, as a much-praised hopeful, will not be able to implement his reform agenda on his own. It must get the various forces in Ethiopia’s multi-ethnic state at the same table and initiate a genuine national dialogue. Only then can a national sense of belonging be developed, which forms the basis for stability.

[1] Nora Kiefer, Sabine Odhiambo in “Ethiopia at the Crossroads”, Berlin, 27.December2019; http://www.deutsche-afrika-stiftung.de/files/afrikapost_aktuell_aethiopien_am_scheideweg.pdf (May 12, 2020)https://www.indexmundi.com/g/g.aspx?c=et&v=94&l=de; https://wko.at/statistik/laenderprofile/lp-aethiopien.pdf (May 12, 2020)[2] Maria Scurell in “The Country Information Portal” on Ethiopia, March 2020: https://www.liportal.de/aethiopien/wirtschaft-entwicklung/ (12.05.2020)Paloma Anos Casero (IDA), Zeine Zidane (IMF), Kevin Fletcher (IMF) in Joint Bank-Fund Debt Sustainibility Analysis 2018: http://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/690431545161133088/pdf/wbg-ethiopia-debt-sustainability-analysis-2018-update-final-dec0718-12142018-636805946102250783.pdf (12.05.2020)[3] Cf. Tim Heinemann: “Ethiopia 2025: an emerging industrial location in Africa?”, KfW Research No. 249, 27 March 2019: https://www.kfw.de/PDF/Download-Center/Konzernthemen/Research/PDF-Dokumente-Fokus-Volkswirtschaft/Fokus-2019/Fokus-Nr.-249-Maerz-2019-Aethiopien-2025.pdf (12.05.2020)[4] In the meantime, Parliament has specified the postponement in such a way that the elections are to take place in a period of 9-12 months after the end of the Corona pandemic.

July 26, 2020

The Ethiopia’s barbaric ruler PM, Colonel Abiy Ahmed, who is supported by the opportunistic Oromo and Amhara elite politicians has done all at his capacity to remove the Oromo’s lifelong freedom fighter (the current original OLF leader), Obbo Dawu Ibssa from his position to replace him with tripartite selected opportunistic OLF deserters.

The plot is believed to be masterminded by all those who wish to benefit from the subjugation of the Oromo nation that is already paying heavy prices and the entire subjugated nations and peoples of political south in Ethiopia in general.

The OLF’s chair, Obbo Dawud Ibsa and his OLF office’s 24/7 guards who work on three shifts were all removed since the afternoon of July 25, 2020 from his Finfinnee office.

The plan was similar with Colonel Abiy’s regime October 2019 failed attempts to assassinate Obbo Jawar Mohammed due to the bravery of his body guards who have refused to be removed in the middle of night. In the case of Obbo Dawud Ibssa, the culprits used different method by deploying the enemies within the OLF to claim that Obbo Dawud has been replaced by the OLF deserters to justify the transfer of power is a genuine party decision.

The plotters however failed to assert that, at this difficult time not only for the Oromo nation, but also for the entire country- as citizens are executed day and night, no Oromo imagines this will be plausible. Therefore, any sane person can assert the plot is the dirty work of the Oromo’s national enemies.

Therefore, it is imperative to rationalise that the plot of the tripartite quislings against the Oromo’s national interest came into effect in the midst of war waged on the nation by the unionist incumbent that is hell bent on dehumanising Oromo; after masterminding the assassination of the Oromo national icon, poetic singer, song writer and staunch Oromo’s human rights defender, Hacaaluu Hundessa on the 29th of June 2020.

It is also worth mentioning, following Hacaaluu’s PM and his unionist advisers masterminded assassination, numerous Oromo’s high profile politicians including Obbo Bekele Gerba, Obbo Jawar Mohammed, OLF leadership including Abdi Ragassa (for over 2 months), Michael Boran, Dr Shigut Geleta, Lemi Benya, Kenessa Ayana, and Colonel Gemechu Ayana following Hacaalu’s assassination. Moreover, over 15,000 Oromo civilians are unlawfully incarcerated and the entire Oromia is made a war zone.

The Oromo citizens are denied fundamental freedom to movement and existence in their own soil as state of emergency and concomitant state terrorism takes its toll.

As we speak, the Oromos are hunted like predators hunt on their pray; extremely barbaric action that all mankind should denounce and demand the Ethiopia’s PM who is acting like mad dog as he behaves like a psychopath to unconditionally stop!

As the Oromo people of all walks of life globally with like minded federalist groups is united to defend their national interests; its enemies within have inadvertently exposed themselves as they plot to derail the hope of the nation at this difficult time by planning to remove the Oromo’s lifelong freedom fighter from his leadership position.

Parts Of The Indicated Tripartite Plotters From OPP/PP Include;

1. PM colonel Abiy Ahmed, 2) Obbo Lema Megarssa, 3) Obbo Abadula Gamada (Minase) and numerous others.

Parts Of the Indicated Tripartite Plotters From Oromo Democratic Front (ODF):-1. Obbo Lenco Leta (embarrassing life ling opportunist who is also responsible for dismantling OLF’s army during 1992 transition by conspiring with the enemy) 2. Lenco Bati (who is also one of the OLF’s former leaders who has deserted the cause to join the very project that he has claimed was fighting against)3. Dr Beyan Assoba (who is also one of the OLF’s former leaders who has deserted the cause to join the very project that he has claimed was fighting against)

Parts of The Indicated Tripartite Plotters From OLF Include:-1). Ibsa Nagaw (group leader), 2) Tolera Adaba, 3) Atomsa Kumsa 4) Qajjeela (Kajela) Merdasa, 5) Ararsso Bikila, 6) Jawessa Gabissa, 7) Milikias Irko, 8)Waqo (Wako) Kune All three parties have betrayed the Oromo nation and its national cause.

While the Oromo nation and the supporters of the Oromo cause move hand in hand in rejecting state terrorism in Oromia by unanimously denouncing the ongoing executions of hundreds and incarcerations of the Oromo politicians; the surrender of the OLF’s leadership is double crime although no Oromo expected any good from group one and two.

The actions of the third group defy sane beliefs therefore beyond comprehension. The Oromo nation is on war and the nation and their closest allies such the Sidama and the rest are yet in the process of mourning the assassination of the Oromo iconic son, Hacaaluu. Additionally, the Oromo’s noble sons are unlawfully incarcerated and are taken to unknown places.

During such national upheaval for the Oromo nation, the actions of the third party are beyond belief. Paradoxically such coward and egoist actions of the OLF’s deserters are one of the top betrayals of the century in the struggle of the Oromo nation. The leader of the second group is known for his betrayal since 1992 and no one cares about thuggish actions. However, it is difficult to swallow the hardest truth when the comrades who have fought for decades for the same cause along with their comrades during both difficult and good times betray all together.

These groups have betrayed:-

1. The Oromo’s national cause

2. The OLF’s comrades as they remain unlawfully incarcerated – some of them taken to unknown locations

3. The OLF’s lifelong freedom fighter and their leader

4. The heroic and selfless sacrifices of the Oromo’s icon Hacaaluu Hunbdessa.

We denounce with all possible terms the selfish actions of the reckless plotters and demand the Ethiopia’s regime to unconditionally stop state terrorism in Oromia by freeing all Oromo’s political prisoners.

We demand the regime to unconditionally stop its plots to remove obbo Dawud Ibsa.

We denounce the actions of tripartite coalitions and advise them that their reckless actions only add to the ongoing volatility in Oromia and in the country with wider regional ramifications.

Finally, once again we, the Sdiama nation assure the Oromo that, we always stand by you – the Oromo nation, our closest brother and fight together for a common good to the last drop of our blood.

Justice For The Oromo Nation!

May Justice Prevail on Behalf of the Victims!

July 26, 2020

A press release by members of the OLF leaders in the Diaspora

The current political turmoil and security crisis in Oromia as well as Ethiopia is worsening from time to time, severely straining the daily life of citizens. The current machinations to turn Oromia in to a war zone and the catastrophic consequences in terms of human and material destruction is becoming unbearable. In the aftermath of the assassination of our beloved artist Hacaaluu Hundessaa, members of Ethiopia’s armed forces deployed throughout Oromia are tasked with the duty of killing, maiming, imprisoning, and torturing the Oromo people for their alleged membership or support of the OLF.

The OLF had repeatedly issued press releases regarding the worsening situation in the country. Among the alarming signals regarding the immediate jeopardy that the OLF and OFC are about to face include;
1. The residence of Mr. Daawud Ibsa, Chairman of the OLF, is currently under siege by members of the Ethiopian security and armed forces. Mr. Ibsaa’s telephone line is completely disconnected at this time.
2. Government security vehicles are seen driving in and out of the compound of OLF headquarter in the Gullalle subdistrict of Addis Ababa. The surroundings of the OLF head quarter are also under strict surveillance.
3. Reliable sources are indicating that a number of government media outlets are directed to be at the OLF office in Gullallee on Sunday for the purpose of airing a would-be breaking news.
4. Members of the OLF are being deprived of freedom of movement and unable to perform their daily routines of duty.
5. Almost all OLF branch offices throughout Oromia have been destroyed & plundered while leaders and representatives of the organization are jailed.
6. All OLF offices in the suburbs of Finfinne are looted and ransacked.
7. OLF headquarter offices in Gullalle are being searched without any warrant and the imprisonment of members occupying these offices has continued unabated.
8. Ethiopia’s ruling party has embarked on luring some of the gullible and the vulnerable among OLF and OFC rank & file to some petty benefits as a mechanism to divide the integrity of the OLF with an ultimate goal of forcing the Oromo people’s quest for freedom to succumb to the aspirations of the Neo-Naftagna.
9. Oromo intellectuals and business owners are being imprisoned for their alleged support of the OLF.
10. Some members of the government’s police force and the army suspected of supporting or sympathizing with the OLF are being imprisoned while others are being fired from the government structure as employees.

In conclusion, the overall situation of the Oromo peoples’ struggle for freedom, the Oromo Liberation Front and the Oromo Federalist Congress is worrisome. Therefore, we call upon the Oromo people to be vigilant about the machinations of our enemies and to protect the national interest of Oromia, safeguard the integrity of its lead organizations, the OLF & OFC, and the unity of the leaders of our struggle for freedom.
The heroic deeds the Oromo people, both at home and abroad, had hitherto exhibited are very much appreciated and unparalleled by any account. We reiterate the imperative for the Oromo people to stay the course and remain the vanguard of the Oromo Peoples’ struggle for freedom in unison.

Victory to the Oromo People!

July 25, 2020

(A4O, 19 July 2020) Oromia Global Forum held its frist conference over webnar on 18 July 2020.

Many Oromo intellectuals presented thier valuable presentation on this unique conference.

Oromia Global Forum is a global alliance of Oromo Civic, Professional and Faith-Based Organizations and individual proponents of Human Rights, residing in North America, Europe, Australia, Asia and Africa.

Here below is Dr Asafa Jalata’s, The University of Tennessee at Knoxville, presentation on ‘Institutionalizing the Oromo Movement’: PREREQUISITES FOR BUILDING A DEMOCRATIC OROMIA STATE.

Click to access instutionalizing-the-oromo-movement.pdf

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE CONTACT:
18 July 2020

Click to access Ollaa_pressrelease_july18th2020.pdf

OSG Press release 18 July 2020