General Bacha Debele’s article presents a characteristically Ethiopian nationalist perspective on the Red Sea issue, skillfully blending pragmatic language with a deep-seated narrative of historical grievance and a thinly veiled threat. While it calls for cooperation, its foundational premises are so fundamentally one-sided and dismissive of Eritrean sovereignty that they ultimately undermine its own stated goal.

Here is a counter-analysis of its core arguments:

1. On the “Existential Imperative” and Historical Grievance:

• The Article’s Claim: Ethiopia’s need for sea access is an “existential imperative” due to an “unjust” deprivation in 1993. It challenges the legal legitimacy of its loss of Assab and frames the issue as a demand for “historical truth.”
• The Counter-Response: This framing is the primary obstacle to cooperation. It resurrects the central ideological conflict that led to a 30-year war. The 1993 Eritrean independence referendum was conducted with overwhelming international recognition and Ethiopian consent. To now question its legal and moral foundation is to question the very basis of Eritrea’s statehood. For Eritrea, this is not a negotiating point; it is a non-starter. An “existential imperative” for one nation cannot be pursued by threatening the existential sovereignty of another. True pragmatism would accept the 1991-1993 settlement as the immutable foundation for all future talks, not as a subject for “continuous reflection” and re-litigation.

2. On the Portrayal of Eritrea and Its Leadership:

• The Article’s Claim: Eritrea is a “stagnant,” “closed,” “totalitarian” state, a “political relic” whose leadership is isolated, illegitimate, and betrays its own people.
• The Counter-Response: This ad hominem attack on President Isaias and the Eritrean state is not a basis for diplomacy; it is a provocation. Regardless of the accuracy of these criticisms, using them as a preamble to a call for “cooperation” is deeply disingenuous. It positions Ethiopia as both judge and interested party, demanding partnership from a regime it simultaneously declares morally and politically bankrupt. A genuine pragmatist would engage with the state as it is, not as they wish it to be, and would avoid inflammatory language that guarantees a defensive and hostile response.

3. On the Accusations and the “Burden of Restraint”:

• The Article’s Claim: Ethiopia has shown “maximum restraint” while Eritrea “recklessly” undermines it by supporting insurgents and engaging in illicit activities. It places the entire “burden of maintaining stability” on Ethiopia.
• The Counter-Response: This narrative completely inverts the recent history of the region. From an Eritrean and regional perspective, it was Ethiopia under Abiy Ahmed that unilaterally tore up the foundational 2018 peace agreement by reigniting the Tigray conflict in 2020, drawing Eritrea into a devastating war. The article’s portrayal of Ethiopia as the perpetual victim of Eritrean aggression ignores this pivotal context. The claim of “restraint” rings hollow to those who witnessed the consequences of that conflict. The “burden of stability” is a shared one, and Ethiopia’s own actions have been the single greatest destabilizing factor in the Horn in recent years.

4. On the Nature of “Pragmatic Cooperation”:

• The Article’s Claim: The solution is “pragmatic, mutually beneficial cooperation,” which it defines as joint ventures in ports and logistics.
• The Counter-Response: The article’s concept of “pragmatism” is entirely transactional and self-serving. It proposes cooperation on Ethiopian terms, predicated on Ethiopia’s needs, while demanding Eritrea abandon its core security posture. For Eritrea, which fought a long war for sovereignty, security is paramount. Its “isolation” is, from its perspective, a defensive necessity against a much larger and historically dominant neighbor that has never fully accepted its separation. True pragmatism would require Ethiopia to first provide irreversible security guarantees and demonstrate through sustained action that it respects Eritrea’s sovereignty unconditionally. Only then could talks about port access be credible.

Conclusion:

General Bacha’s article, despite its polished language, is not a genuine offer of partnership. It is an ultimatum disguised as diplomacy. It tells Eritrea: “Your state is a failed relic, your leader is a tyrant, your independence is legally questionable, and you are a source of instability. Now, please grant us sovereign access to your coast for our existential needs.”

This approach is destined to fail. It reinforces every Eritrean suspicion about Ethiopian hegemony. If Ethiopia sincerely desires Red Sea access, it must abandon the language of historical grievance and moral superiority. It must:

1. Formally and unequivocally reaffirm the borders established in 1993.
2. Engage in quiet, respectful diplomacy without public preconditions and inflammatory rhetoric.
3. Acknowledge its role in regional instability and work to rebuild decimated trust.

The “defining moment” for the Horn of Africa is not whether Eritrea capitulates to Ethiopian demands, but whether Ethiopia can evolve beyond a neo-imperial mindset that views its neighbors as extensions of its own national destiny. Until it does, the Red Sea will remain not a conduit for shared prosperity, but a moat guarding against a past Eritrea will never accept again.

How has ODF’s platform evolved since its founding?

The platform of the Oromian Defense Force (ODF), often associated with the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), has evolved significantly since its founding. While the core principle of national self-determination for the Oromo has remained constant, the specific vision and political tactics have adapted to changing conditions in Ethiopia.[1][2][3]

Early Objectives: Independence and Liberation
At its founding in 1973, the OLF/ODF’s primary goal was achieving full independence for Oromia, framed as liberation from what was perceived as Abyssinian (Amhara) colonial rule. This initially included calls for the creation of a sovereign Oromo state outside of Ethiopia, accompanied by armed struggle against the government.[2][4][1]

Evolution to Self-Determination Within a Federal Ethiopia
Over time, especially after Ethiopia’s regime change in 1991, the OLF began shifting toward the idea of national self-determination—asserting the right of the Oromo to decide, through a democratic process, whether to remain within a restructured, truly federal Ethiopia or pursue independence. The platform emphasized voluntary union with other nations based on equality and mutual respect rather than enforced secession.[1][2]

Engagement and Withdrawal from Federal Politics
The OLF participated in Ethiopia’s transitional government after the fall of the Derg regime in 1991, indicating willingness to cooperate with broader Ethiopian movements. However, citing harassment and political exclusion, the OLF soon withdrew, reinforcing its orientation toward armed struggle and political autonomy.[5][1]

Shift Toward Democratization and Inclusive Struggle
By the 2010s and especially after 2012, some OLF factions voiced a willingness to work for democracy and freedom within Ethiopia rather than outright secession. This broadening of goals to include justice, democratization, and inclusion emerged more strongly during the Abiy Ahmed era.[3][5][1]

Recent Developments: Unity, Decentralization, and Peace
Recent ODF and OLA documents highlight continued emphasis on:
– Self-determination and responsive government via democratic means[3]
– Economic sovereignty and development for the Oromo people[3]
– Socio-cultural rights: language, culture, local governance[3]
– The possibility of a political union with other Ethiopian groups based on voluntary association and equality, rather than either forced unity or imposed independence[2][1]
– Openness to negotiation and peaceful resolution, alongside continued resistance to central state repression[6][3]

Factional Complexity
The evolution of the ODF’s platform has also included internal splits, such as the division between the OLF and the OLA over armed resistance and disarmament processes. These reflect broader debates within Oromo nationalism regarding practical versus maximalist goals, and engagement versus resistance, as Ethiopia’s political context has shifted.[5][6]

Overall, the ODF’s platform evolved from calls for independence to a nuanced program of self-determination, democratization, and potential federal partnership—adapted to challenges and opportunities presented by Ethiopian politics since the 1970s.[1][2][5][3]

Sources
[1] Oromo Liberation Front – Wikipediaen.wikipedia.org › wiki › Oromo_Liberation_Front https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oromo_Liberation_Front
[2] Mission – Oromo Liberation Front https://oromoliberationfront.org/english/mission/
[3] A BRIEF POLITICAL MANIFESTO https://www.fnnmedia.org/media/images/OLA_Brief_Manifesto.pdf
[4] Political program of Oromia Liberation Front- O.L.F – FINFINNE MEDIA http://samsondoya.blogspot.com/2013/08/political-program-of-oromia-liberation.html
[5] Country policy and information note: Oromos, the … https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ethiopia-country-policy-and-information-notes/country-policy-and-information-note-oromos-the-oromo-liberation-front-and-the-oromo-liberation-army-ethiopia-march-2022-accessible
[6] About the Oromo Liberation Army | OLF-OLA https://www.olf-olahq.org/about
[7] Open Dialogue Foundation https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Open_Dialogue_Foundation
[8] Clark Anna 2010, ‘Politicians Using History’, Wiley https://opus.lib.uts.edu.au/bitstream/10453/14057/1/2009008262.pdf
[9] The good old days: how nostalgia clouds our view of … https://theconversation.com/the-good-old-days-how-nostalgia-clouds-our-view-of-political-crises-52309
[10] Oromo Liberation Army – Wikipedia https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Oromo_Liberation_Army

Why Oromian Defense Force-ODF necessary and important?

The term “Oromia Defence Force” is commonly used to refer to the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), an armed group fighting in the Oromia region of Ethiopia. The OLA, distinct from the now-defunct Oromo Liberation Front (OLF), has engaged in guerrilla warfare and is known for its alliance with the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) against the Ethiopian federal government. The conflict is complex, involving clashes with the Ethiopian National Defense Force (ENDF) and reports of violence against civilians by all parties. 

Key aspects of the OLA

Impact: The conflict has led to significant violence and displacement, with reports of thousands of people killed in clashes and attacks. 

The Oromian Defense Force (ODF), represented prominently by groups such as the Oromo Liberation Army (OLA), is considered necessary and important primarily to protect the rights, self-determination, and security of the Oromo people in Ethiopia. Historically, Oromia’s indigenous defense mechanisms have evolved to resist political exclusion, economic exploitation, and cultural marginalization, functioning within both traditional frameworks like the Gadaa system and modern liberation movements.[1][2][3][4]

Goals: The OLA states it is fighting for the rights of the Oromo people, with some reports indicating goals to achieve independence and overthrow the current government.

Conflict: The group is engaged in an armed conflict with the Ethiopian government and its forces, which has included taking control of towns and fighting in various parts of Oromia.

Alliances: The OLA has formed alliances, most notably a military partnership with the Tigrayan rebels, which was announced in 2021.

Accusations: The OLA has been accused of human rights violations, including attacks on civilians, though the group has denied some of these claims. The Ethiopian government designated the OLA as a terrorist group in May 2021.

Historical context: A splinter group that refused to disarm after the OLF was removed from a terrorist list in 2018, the OLA is the successor to a long-standing armed movement formed in the 1970s.

Defense of Rights and Sovereignty
The ODF’s central role is to ensure Oromos can freely determine their political future and establish governance responsive to their community. This necessity arose from a long history of systemic oppression and a lack of autonomy under various Ethiopian regimes, making self-defense structures vital for safeguarding basic freedoms.[4][1]

Security and Protection
With ongoing regional instability, the ODF defends the Oromo population from violence perpetrated by state and non-state actors, especially in the absence or perceived failure of federal security forces. The dissolution of regional special forces and controversial federal interventions have made localized defense more critical for community survival and resilience.[5]

Cultural and Social Empowerment
The ODF supports socio-cultural rights, fighting against marginalization, and upholding the Oromo identity. It mobilizes not only militarily but also ideologically, drawing strength from community participation and moral legitimacy among Oromos. Activists emphasize the necessity for a united movement to preserve language, values, and collective security, especially as diaspora resources grow.[6][7]

Political Leverage and Defense
The ODF functions as both a deterrent and a negotiating force, influencing balance-of-power dynamics within Ethiopia. Its continued existence sustains Oromo representation amidst competing ethnic interests and shifting alliances, preserving a critical, independent voice in national affairs.[7][8]

Traditional Legitimacy
Rooted historically in the Gadaa system, the ODF symbolizes continuity in indigenous governance, promoting peace, security, and self-rule while resisting exploitation. Its importance is also recognized in academic and cultural discussions as a means of upholding democratic principles and Oromo sovereignty.[2]

In summary, the ODF is seen as both a practical and symbolic bulwark for protecting Oromo communities’ political, social, and cultural futures, while enabling the pursuit of peace, security, and empowerment within Ethiopia.[1][2][4][6]

Sources
[1] A BRIEF POLITICAL MANIFESTO https://www.fnnmedia.org/media/images/OLA_Brief_Manifesto.pdf
[2] Copyright © 2023 The Author(s): This work is licensed under a Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International (CC BY-NC 4.0) https://isrgpublishers.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/ISRGJAHSS2032023.pdf
[3] Mission – Oromo Liberation Front https://oromoliberationfront.org/english/mission/
[4] Country policy and information note: Oromos, the … https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/ethiopia-country-policy-and-information-notes/country-policy-and-information-note-oromos-the-oromo-liberation-front-and-the-oromo-liberation-army-ethiopia-march-2022-accessible
[5] EPO November 2023 Monthly: An Evolving Conflict … https://acleddata.com/update/epo-november-2023-monthly-evolving-conflict-environment-oromia
[6] THE OROMO NATION: TOWARD MENTAL LIBERATION … https://advocacy4oromia.org/article/the-oromo-nation-toward-mental-liberation-and-empowerment/
[7] OLF-OLA, the Northern Alliances, and the Oromo Cause https://oromia.today/olf-ola-the-northern-alliances-and-the-oromo-cause/
[8] Conflict in Ethiopia | Global Conflict Tracker https://www.cfr.org/global-conflict-tracker/conflict/conflict-ethiopia
[9] OLF is the immune system of the Oromo nations https://advocacy4oromia.org/oromia/olf-is-the-immune-system-of-the-oromo-nations/
[10] Analyzing Why Ethiopia Launched a New Military … https://futureuae.com/clients.tar.bz2/Mainpage/Item/9780/fano-militia-analyzing-why-ethiopia-launched-a-new-military-operation-in-the-amhara-region

Why is the coordination of OLF, OFC and OPP necessary for the advancement of political interest of Oromo?

This is a fundamental question in contemporary Oromo politics. The argument that coordination between the OLF, OFC, and OPP is necessary stems from a strategic analysis of the challenges facing the Oromo people.

Here is a breakdown of the reasoning, based on common political arguments:

1. Overcoming Political Fragmentation

The Oromo people, despite being the largest ethnic group in Ethiopia, have often found their political influence weakened by internal divisions. Each of these three parties represents significant, but distinct, segments of Oromo society:

· OLF (Oromo Liberation Front): Represents the longstanding nationalist and self-determination struggle. It has historical credibility, a strong diaspora base, and is seen by its supporters as the standard-bearer for Oromo sovereignty.
· OFC (Oromo Federalist Congress): Represents a civil disobedience and legalist approach. Led by prominent figures like Merera Gudina and the imprisoned Jawar Mohammed, it has massive grassroots mobilization within Oromia and focuses on working within (or challenging) the constitutional federal system.
· OPP (Oromo People’s Party): Often seen as representing a pragmatic and moderate wing. It aims to build broader coalitions and may appeal to constituencies wary of the more hardline stances of the other parties.

The Necessity: When these groups work at cross-purposes, they split the Oromo vote, confuse the international community, and allow the central government to employ a “divide and rule” strategy. Coordination creates a unified front, presenting a single set of demands and a coherent political vision, which is far more powerful than fragmented voices.

2. Creating a Unified Bargaining Position

A divided opposition has little leverage in negotiations with a powerful central government. The incumbent Prosperity Party (PP) can easily ignore, co-opt, or suppress isolated groups.

· Strength in Numbers: A coordinated bloc of the OLF, OFC, and OPP would represent an overwhelming majority of Oromo political sentiment. This makes it impossible for the government to dismiss them as a “fringe group” and forces genuine negotiation.
· Negotiating from Strength: Whether the goal is greater autonomy, fairer distribution of resources, or a genuine federal system, a unified Oromo position would have significantly more weight in determining the future of the Ethiopian state.

3. Pooling Resources and Capabilities

Each party has unique strengths that, when combined, create a more formidable political force:

· The OLF brings a clear, historic ideology and a dedicated network of supporters.
· The OFC possesses unparalleled grassroots mobilization and a proven ability to organize mass movements.
· The OPP can offer a bridge to other ethnic groups and a platform for more moderate or coalition-oriented politics.

The Necessity: By coordinating, they can pool their organizational skills, international advocacy efforts, and grassroots networks. This makes their collective action—be it electoral campaigns, diplomatic outreach, or peaceful protest—infinitely more effective.

4. Countering External Threats and Ensuring Security

The phrase “thwart the campaign from the north to Oromia” directly references security concerns, particularly the expansion of the war involving the Tigray People’s Liberation Front (TPLF) or other Amhara forces into Oromia.

· A fragmented Oromo political leadership cannot coordinate a unified defense or security strategy.
· A coordinated command or political directive would be essential to organize resistance, protect civilians, and present a united stance against any invading force. Disunity makes Oromia vulnerable.

5. Legitimizing the Struggle and Providing a Clear Alternative

For the average Oromo, political disunity at the top leads to disillusionment and apathy. When parties are squabbling, it delegitimizes the entire struggle for self-determination.

· A Credible Alternative: Coordination shows the Oromo people and the world that these leaders can put aside differences for the greater good. It presents a credible alternative to the current government, not just as protest movements, but as a potential governing coalition.
· Restoring Faith: It helps rebuild public trust in the political process by demonstrating that the leadership is serious about achieving tangible results rather than pursuing individual party agendas.

In summary, the argument is that the political interests of the Oromo people are too vast and face too powerful an opponent to be advanced by any single party acting alone. The coordination of the OLF, OFC, and OPP is seen not as a preference, but as a strategic imperative to

· Consolidate political power.
· Negotiate effectively with the state.
· Defend the region with coordinated force-Oromian Defense Force.
· Present a viable path forward for the Oromo nation.

Without this unity, the risk is continued marginalization, despite the Oromo people’s numerical majority and historical claims.

The Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) announces with profound sadness the passing of our devoted member and comrade, Jal Girma Didha Beyana. He died on October 21, 2025, at the age of 62, after suffering from an illness contracted during his imprisonment. His funeral was held on October 26, 2025, at the Sululta Church Silasie town, surrounded by family, relatives, and comrades.

Comrade Girma was born in December 1964 in the rural village of Abichu, in the heart of Oromia, to his father, Mr. Didha Bayana, and his mother, Mrs. Jorro Arado. A dedicated son, he supported his family from a young age and pursued his education with determination, attending Gullalle Dannaba school, Wednesday Market school, and the ‘Ethiopia Tikdem’ teacher training institute in Finfinne.

His life was defined by unwavering commitment to his family and his people. Upon the death of his mother, he returned home as the only son to support his father. From a young age, he was politically conscious, and he formally joined the Oromo Liberation Front, where he received military and political training. He served with distinction during the Charter era and played a vital role in the struggle, often undertaking long and dangerous journeys to advance the cause.

Comrade Girma paid a heavy personal price for his convictions. The former Woyane regime, unable to capture him, brutally beat his father, Mr. Didha Beyana, in an attempt to find him—an act witnessed by the entire community. He endured repeated imprisonment and torture for his political views in prisons such as Chancho, Sululta, and Maikelawi. Despite being a father of 14, he was forced to leave his ancestral home in 2006 and relocate to Sululta, where he continued to face persecution and incarceration.

Beyond his political struggle, Comrade Girma was a pillar of his community. He was a founding member of the Sibilu River Development Association in 2003, initiating projects that continue to benefit many today. He also tirelessly advocated for infrastructure, such as the rural road in Abichu, striving to serve his people through tangible development.

The Oromo Liberation Front expresses its deepest condolences to the family, children, and close relatives of Comrade Jal Girma Didha Beyana. We pray for your patience and strength during this immeasurable loss.

His legacy of resilience and service will not be forgotten.

The struggle continues!
Victory for the masses!

Oromo Liberation Front
October 26, 2025
Finfinne