THE DAROD POLITICAL AND CLAN FAMILY:

Oppressor Nationalism, Political Power, War, Massacres, and the Fragmentation of Somali[1]
Asfaw Beyene and Asafa Jalata
1. Introduction
The Somali people are organized into clans and extended families, alongside historically marginalized indigenous communities such as the Bantu. These communities have experienced racialization, oppression, social exclusion, and discrimination. They include Bantu and non-Bantu groups such as Gosha, Shabelle, Mushunguli, Shidle, Awer, and Eyle. They have their distinct cultures, histories, and identities. In her book, Unravelling Somalia: Race, Class, and the Legacy of Slavery (1999), Catherine Besteman critically examines the historical marginalization, social exclusion, and discrimination experienced by the Bantu and other communities of Somalia, particularly in relation to slavery, race, class, and power in Somali society.
A similar dynamic of racial, cultural, and claimed civilizational hierarchy can be observed in the treatment of the Oromo, the largest ethnonational group in the Horn of Africa. Such attitudes have been expressed by certain nationalist circles within Ethiopian communities, particularly among some Amhara, Tigre, and certain Darod (Daarood) Somali political and religious actors. Historically, derogatory terms have been used to stigmatize the Oromo and other people of Ethiopia, reinforce negative stereotypes, and construct narratives of racial, religious, and cultural superiority. These patterns of discriminatory rhetoric continue to surface in contemporary political discourse, particularly on social media, where some Habesha and Somali political and religious activists appear to converge around anti-Oromo narratives – to delegitimize Oromo perspectives and denigrate the Oromo people.
The intersection of clan-based and racialized politics is particularly dangerous because it reinforces prejudice, deepens social divisions, legitimizes discrimination, massacres, and gross human rights violations. Decent and conscientious human beings should recognize these harmful dynamics, reject divisive politics, and refuse to participate in the dehumanization of other peoples. No clan, national, religion, or cultural group should be used as a basis for claiming superiority over another to justify oppression, exploitation, and dehumanization.
The Darod, a clan family of the Somali nationality, has played a significant role in the political, military, economic, and social history of the Horn of Africa. Its communities are distributed across Somalia, Somaliland, Ethiopia, Kenya, Djibouti, and the wider Somali diaspora. Within Somalia, major Darod lineages include the Marehan, Majeerteen, Ogaden, Dhulbahante, Warsangeli, and other related subclans.[2]
Somali clan structures are networks of claimed ancestral lineages and descent whereby individuals traditionally trace their ancestry through the paternal line to a common founding progenitor, often across many generations. These genealogical relationships have historically shaped social identity, community organizations, alliances, conflict resolution, and political affiliation.[3] Since Somalia gained independence in 1960, Darod political clan leaders and networks have occupied influential positions in national politics and state institutions. Their historical and political influence makes the Darod clan family an important subject of inquiry. Their politics forms an important part of Somalia’s broader national history. A balanced historical account must also examine the abuses committed by political leaders and military organizations associated with Darod-led governments.
This paper examines both the historical contributions and political controversies associated with Darod leadership. Attention is given to the chronology of documented atrocities, political abuses, and strategic errors in decisions and actions made under Darod-led governments and political cronies. It also explores how the actions of political and military actors contributed to the weakening of national institutions, the fragmentation of Somali society, and the country’s prolonged struggle to reestablish a sustainable democratic and inclusive national government. The objective is not to assign collective responsibility to an entire clan family, but to examine political power, historical accountability, and the consequences of genealogy-driven political patronage.
2. Clan Politics, Dictatorship, and Gross Human Right violations
Genealogy and kinship are known to have influenced political relationships in at least three countries: Somalia, Libya, and Yemen. In these countries, ancestry-based networks have historically shaped social relationships, political alliances, patronage, local governance, and access to traditional authority.[4] However, Somalia’s political system has developed a particularly formalized role for clan affiliation. The “4.5 power-sharing formula” is one example. It allocates parliamentary representation among the four major Somali clan-family groupings, with a half-share assigned collectively to minority communities. Although the formula emerged as a political arrangement intended to facilitate power-sharing during the country’s state-rebuilding effort, clannism seems to have always been part of Somali body politics, preceding the reconstruction effort of the state. Even political negotiations intended to address interclan disparities remain contingent on clan approval, an antithesis of their very purpose.
The institutionalization of clan identity has consequently become a major factor in the distribution of political representation and public authority at all levels. This arrangement created an enduring tension between inherited clan affiliation and benevolent constitutional principles of equal citizenship, political participation, meritocracy, and non-discrimination. Clan identity influenced government formation, political appointments, and access to public institutions, even when national institutions are intended to establish the equality of all citizens (for reference click this link). The ideals of equality, fraternity, and liberty could not overcome clan loyalty at a grand national level, making all collective efforts beyond the clan’s tapered interest a perpetually fatal effort.
The most consequential period of Darod political influence in modern Somalia was the military dictatorship of Mohamed Siad Barre, who ruled from 1969 until 1991. Barre was a member of the Darod clan family. His government publicly promoted national unity and prohibited political discussion of clan identity. In practice, however, personal loyalty, family relationships, military connections, and patronage networks became key features of his regime.
Barre’s political decisions contributed to the Ogaden War of 1977 – 1978, the persecution of Majeerteen communities following the failed 1978 coup attempt, the destruction of Isaaq-populated cities in the north, and the eventual collapse of the Somali state. Barre government’s military campaign in the north resulted in the deaths of tens of thousands of people, according to estimates documented by human rights investigators. Africa Watch reported that 50,000 to 60,000 (link) people had been killed by the beginning of 1990, although other estimates claim a much higher number. Large numbers of civilians fled to Ethiopia. These atrocities are widely known as the Isaaq genocide.
It is important to recognize that the political system responsible for the death of hundreds of thousands was organized primarily around inherited genealogical affiliation and counted lineage, not around shared Somali culture, language, religion, or other common traits that might otherwise unite a people across political camps. In Somalia’s Darod, genealogy became a paramount basis for political classification, representation, patronage, and access to power, taking precedence over the broader Somali identity and principles of equal citizenship. Once the clan loyalty governed trust, once it superseded the basis for all organizational frameworks and cured into the citizen’s psychic displacing logic, it became impossible to overcome the insolent sense of communal identity, impossible to build a collective nation state with other clans.
3. Pre-Independence Politics, 1940s–1960
Before independence, Somali political nationalism developed around the idea of unifying Somali-inhabited territories divided among British Somaliland, Italian Somaliland, French Somaliland, Ethiopia, and Kenya. This objective became known as Greater Somalia (Soomaaliweyn).
The Darod dominated Somali Youth League, established in 1943 in Mogadishu, became a central organization in the development of Somali nationalism and the movement for independence. Its political aspirations included the unification of Somali-inhabited territories. The Greater Somalia project eventually generated serious tensions with Ethiopia and Kenya because it challenged their territorial sovereignty (link). So, the idea of Somali territorial unity existed before independence, while the modern political project of Greater Somalia emerged principally during the 1940s, alongside the independence movement.
As we describe below, the political project of Greater Somalia was expanded during the government of Siad Barre to include all Muslim Oromos in Eastern and Southern Oromia. Darod communities in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia and northeastern Kenya had a significant interest in this political project because colonial borders divided populations with shared linguistic, cultural, and family connections. Thus, although it was rooted in Darod clan politics, the Greater Somalia concept was not however exclusively a Darod political project. It attracted support from Somali political activists and communities across different clan families.[5] The project continued to influence political debates among Somali communities in the Horn of Africa and the diaspora. Its legacy remains important in understanding relations between Somali nationalism, regional self-determination movements, and the territorial integrity of neighboring states.
Early Civilian Government: In 1941, following the defeat of Italian forces in the East African during World War II, Ogaden was placed under British administration and later in 1948 transferred to Ethiopian control. Somalia became independent in 1960 following the union of British Somaliland and the former Italian-administered territory. Aden Abdulle Osman Daar of the Hawiye clan was elected as the first president and held power between 1960 and 1967. He was the first African leader who accepted his defeat by election. Then, Abdirashid Ali Shermarke, a prominent Darod politician became Somalia’s second president. Other Darod representatives also participated in parliamentary politics and successive civilian administrations. By then, Darod politicians on both sides of the Ethio-Somali border had become significant participants in the new nation’s political institutions, already debating about clan representation and the future of the Somali state. At the same time, the Greater Somalia idea championed by Darod activists, continued to influence political debates and relations with Ethiopia and Kenya. These tensions helped establish the political environment for later military confrontation.
4. Siad Barre’s Military Coup and Authoritarian Rule
On October 21, 1969, Major General Mohamed Siad Barre from the Marehan subclan of the Darod family, seized power following the assassination of President Abdirashid Ali Shermarke and a military coup. His government abolished the existing constitutional order, suspended parliament, banned political parties, and established the Supreme Revolutionary Council.
The new military government promoted the slogan of national unity and prohibited public discussion of clan identity while seeking and organizing the support of his clan.[6] The regime increasingly relied on personal loyalty, family relationships, military connections, and patronage networks. As Barre consolidated his authority, he placed trusted relatives and selected military officers in important political, security, and administrative positions.
One political arrangement associated with Barre’s regime became known as the MOD alliance.[7] The name referred to three Darod subclans: Marehan which is Barre’s own patrilineal family, Ogaden representing Barre’s mother’s side, and Dhulbahante, a lineage connected to the regime through family and political relationships, including Barre’s son-in-law, General Mohamed Said Hersi Morgan.
The MOD networks provided the regime with political, military, security, and administrative support. However, it should not be assumed that every Marehan, Ogaden, or Dhulbahante person benefited from the government or participated in its abuses. The arrangement principally benefited politically connected individuals and elites who received positions, protection, or resources through the regime.
The concentration of political power in the narrow hands of Darod lineage generated resentment among excluded groups, including other Darod communities, particularly the Majeerteen, as well as Hawiye and Isaaq communities. Barre’s government increasingly transformed clan affiliation and personal loyalty into instruments of political control.
5. The Ambition of Greater Somalia and the invasion of Oromia and Ethiopia
Between 1973 and 1978, the Barre regime and its collaborators encouraged, supported, and financed the formation of two organizations, namely the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) and the Somali “Abbo” Liberation Front (SALF) to annex the Somali and the Muslim Oromo areas of Oromia in the Ethiopian Empire. Some Oromos including the Garri were recruited to the SALF to fight against the Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) and other groups who aligned with the OLF (link).
The SALF was controlled by Darod dominated Somali security forces and draftee Oromos.[8] The Siad Barre government killed Oromo nationalists including Major Salleessaa Jaaloo, Buruu Dinnee, Saaraa Jaarsoo, Maammaa Waaqoo, and Abdulahi Gamash who went to Somalia in the early 1970s to engage in dialogues about the Oromo national struggle. They were killed because they refused to accept Somali identity and join Somali “Abbo”.[9] Barre’s government also imprisoned the Oromo guerrilla group called Qeerro Ganama led by Jaarraa Abbaa Gadaa and Mul’is for many years for refusing to accept Somali identity and Barre’s political agenda. They suffered in Somali jails because they held their Oromo national identity and determination to fight for the liberation of Oromia (link). Furthermore, a Somali group, which was probably financed by the Somali government assassinated the chairman of the OLF Magarsa Barii and nine of his cabinet members in 1980 at Shinniga in Ogaden while they were traveling to Mogadishu.[10] Today April 15 is remembered by Oromos worldwide as Oromo Martyrs’ Day.
The war between Somalia and Ethiopia between 1977 and 1978 was not only to unite Somalis in Ethiopia with Somalia; it was also a colonial project to colonize and incorporate fertile Oromo land by “Somalizing” some Oromos groups. Unfortunately, this war was fought between the two states was mainly fought on the Oromo soil and victimized millions of Oromos.[11] The war that started in the late 1970s is still going in different forms on Eastern and Southern parts of Oromia by the Darod dominated Somali regional state in Ethiopia and its allies.
One of the most consequential decisions of Barre’s presidency was the invasion of Ethiopia in July 1977. The conflict was rooted in the Greater Somalia project and the desire to bring the Somali-inhabited Ogaden region of Ethiopia, a major territory claimed by Darod clan, and Muslim Oromos under Somali sovereignty. Before committing regular Somali military forces, the Somali government supported the Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF), SALF, and other Somali insurgent activities in Ethiopia (link).
The initial Somali/Darod offensive achieved substantial territorial gains. For many Somalis in the Ogaden, the advance of the Somali military was viewed as an opportunity to escape Ethiopian rule. The invasion also generated considerable nationalist enthusiasm inside Somalia. The Ethiopian government subsequently launched a major counteroffensive. Somalia, which was led by the Darod establishment was defeated and withdrew its forces from Oromia and Ethiopia in March 1978. The defeat had devastating consequences for Barre’s government and the Somali economy. It contributed to a major refugee crisis, large-scale displacement, economic decline, and a weakening of Barre’s political legitimacy. Barre became increasingly suspicious of his military officers and political opponents who questioned his leadership, especially those who were not from his clan or sub-clans.
6. The 1978 Coup Attempt and Reprisals Against the Majeerteen
Following the defeat in the Ogaden War, a group of Somali military officers attempted to overthrow Barre’s government in April 1978. The coup attempt was led principally by officers associated with the Majeerteen subclan of Darod. The coup failed, and several participants were executed while others escaped to Ethiopia.
Barre’s government subsequently treated the Majeerteen population with vengeance, associating the community with the attempted overthrow of the regime. Security forces carried out punitive operations in Majeerteen-inhabited areas, particularly in northeastern and central Somalia. Reported abuses included extrajudicial killings, arrests, disappearances, destruction of water reservoirs and other essential infrastructure, confiscation of livestock, rape, and collective punishment of civilians suspected of supporting opposition forces. These practices weakened the social and economic conditions in which opposition groups could operate.
The repression of Majeerteen communities illustrates that clan affiliation did not guarantee protection from state violence if political loyalty to the regime is betrayed. Shared genealogy could be sidestepped, and even family members can be punished severely for any modest political disloyalty.
The Formation of the Somali Salvation Democratic Front: In 1978, opposition figures established the Somali Salvation Democratic Front (SSDF), which became one of the first major armed organizations challenging Barre’s government. The SSDF was particularly associated with Majeerteen political and military opposition. Its emergence marked an important turning point: a Darod-associated political organization was now fighting a Darod-led government. The government’s campaign against the Majeerteen established an early pattern of collective punishment that would later be used against other Somali populations.
7. The Rise of Darod induced Nationalism and the Isaaq Massacre
In 1981, Somali exiles and opposition figures established the Somali National Movement (SNM) to fight Siad Barre’s regime, which became the principal armed opposition movement in northwestern Somalia. The SNM drew much of its support from the Isaaq community.
The organization opposed Barre’s dictatorship, political exclusion, abuses of security-forces, and the concentration of state power in the hands of the president and his allies. The government viewed the SNM as a direct threat to its survival. Rather than pursuing a comprehensive political settlement, Barre’s administration increasingly relied on military and security repression.
Throughout the 1980s, the Darod dominated Somali government increased its military presence in the north. Civilians were progressively treated as potential supporters of the insurgency. Government forces conducted arrests, torture, executions, and operations against communities suspected of assisting the SNM. These actions further weakened trust between the northern population and the central government. By 1988, the conflict has approached its most destructive stage; the SNM launched a major offensive attacking government positions and taking control of important urban centers including Hargeisa and Burao. Barre’s government responded with a massive military counteroffensive. The Somali National Army, including ground forces and air units, attacked cities, towns, villages, and civilian populations. Government aircraft and artillery extensively bombarded Hargeisa and Burao, destroying large parts of both cities. The Isaaq and other non-Darod clans were met with extreme brutality, treated as foreign enemies beyond the protection of international laws of war, not like citizens of their own land. Government forces attacked rural settlements, livestock, water sources, and food supplies. Civilians were killed, displaced, and deprived of essential means of survival. Human rights investigators documented systematic attacks against Isaaq civilians, and the collective punishment of communities was intensified against civilians suspected of supporting the SNM. Africa Watch estimated that 50,000 to 60,000 (link) people were killed by the beginning of 1990, although casualty estimates vary among sources, – with some sources estimating over 100,000 killed. Hundreds of thousands of people fled to Ethiopia. The two Darod senior figures most closely associated with the campaign were President Mohamed Siad Barre, who was commander-in-chief, and Mohamed Said Hersi Morgan, a senior military commander and Barre’s son-in-law. Morgan became strongly associated with northern military operations. The atrocities became internationally known as the Isaaq genocide.[12] Scholars, human rights advocates, and members of the affected community use the term to describe the systematic destruction and persecution of Isaaq civilians.
The destruction of northern cities and the mass displacement of civilians seriously, likely permanently damaged the possibility of reconciliation between the northern and southern Somali populations. These events were a major factor in the subsequent declaration of Somaliland’s independence in 1991.
8. The Repression of Hawiye and the Collapse of Barre’s Government
As opposition expanded, Barre increasingly treated political dissent as an existential threat. The United Somali Congress (USC), supported by Hawiye communities, emerged as a major armed opposition movement. The government once again responded with severe repression. Military operations in Mogadishu and surrounding regions included indiscriminate shelling, arrests, executions, and attacks on civilians. Human rights organizations documented the human cost of the conflict and the widespread breakdown of public security (link). The repression contributed to the expansion of armed opposition. By late 1990, the USC was advancing toward Mogadishu. In January 1991, Barre’s government collapsed, and Barre fled the capital. The government’s clan-based policies had created deep divisions among Somali communities. Governance had become increasingly dependent on genealogy networks and personal loyalty. When the central government collapsed, no functioning national institution remained capable of preventing armed factions from fighting for control of territory, government property, military installations, and economic resources.[13] Clan politics was the only politics that ruled Somalia, and when it came to its inevitable end, Somalia became a textbook example of a collapsed nation state.
The collapse of the state resulted from clan-based authoritarian rule, the destruction of national institutions, political exclusion, armed opposition, competing territorial claims, and the failure to establish a negotiated transition, predominantly led by Darod clan politicians. These were central to the weakening of the Somali state. Following the collapse of the central government, violence against people identified with the Darod clan family emerged. These retaliatory acts contributed to new cycles of displacement and despair.
The Establishment of Puntland: Following the collapse of the Darod dominated Mogadishu regime, northeastern Somali political leaders pursued a different strategy; rather than attempting to capture Mogadishu, they organized local political conferences and started negotiations involving traditional elders, political representatives, and civil society. Consequently, in August 1998, the Puntland State of Somalia was established as a self-governing regional administration within the internationally recognized borders of Somalia. Col. Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed served as the first president until 2004. This political development reflected an effort to establish regional security and administration while maintaining a federal relationship with the Somali state.
Meanwhile, efforts to centralize power in Somalia continued and Abdullahi Yusuf Ahmed moved Mogadishu to become president of Somalia’s Transitional Federal Government in October 2004 and served in that capacity until December 2008. His presidency represented the return of a prominent Darod political figure to the national executive. He resigned amid political disagreements, internal government divisions, and continuing conflict. The subsequent election of another Darodian, Mohamed Abdullahi Farmaajo in 2017 further demonstrated that Darod politicians continued to hold significant influence in Somali politics. Enough internal trust and determination seem always to be available to keep non-Darodian politicians outside of Somali political governance despite internal power struggle within the Darod leadership.
9. Darod Political Movements Beyond Somalia: Ethiopia and Kenya
Darod political history extends beyond Somalia’s internationally recognized borders. The Darod dominated ONLF emerged as a major political and armed movement representing sections of the Somali population in Ethiopia’s Somali Region[14]. Its political objectives have included self-determination, political representation, human rights, and greater local control.
The ONLF fought Ethiopian government forces for many years. The conflict involved serious abuse and civilian displacement. Human Rights Watch (link) documented allegations of war crimes and crimes against humanity in the Ogaden area, including abuses attributed to Ethiopian government forces. In October 2018, the ONLF and the Ethiopian government signed a joint declaration that ended the armed conflict and opened the way for the organization to pursue its political objectives through peaceful means (link).
Somali communities in northeastern Kenya, the Darod clan primarily, have also participated in political movements concerning regional representation, security, land rights, and the historical Northern Frontier District question. The Greater Somalia project influenced the Shifta War of 1963–1967, when Darod dominated Somali secessionists fought Kenyan government forces.[15] The conflict resulted in displacement, state repression, civilian deaths, and long-term insecurity. Research on the Shifta War emphasizes the importance of decolonization, Cold War politics, state-building, and the political and socioeconomic conditions of northeastern Kenya.[16]
10. Darod and Oromo Political Tensions in Oromia and Ethiopia
Somali and Oromo pastoral communities have historically shared grazing areas, water sources, and trading routes. Their relationships have included cooperation, trade, intermarriage, competition, and conflict.[17] As discussed above, Darodian Somali nationalism has historically included the Greater Somalia concept and the demand for Somali self-determination in Ethiopia. On the other hand, Oromo nationalism has developed around sovereignty, security, political representation, self-determination or the restructuring of the Ethiopian colonial state. At times, the Somali nationalist and expansionist project, which aspires to incorporate some Oromos and the Oromo land to Somalia has contributed to mutual suspicion and political confrontation (link). Additionally, the Greater Somalia rhetoric generated concern among Oromo political organizations and other Ethiopian communities when it appears to challenge Ethiopia’s territorial sovereignty or make claims over areas inhabited by Oromo populations.
During the establishment of ethnic federalism in the early 1990s, the Tigrayan led government of Ethiopia incorporated certain territories of Oromia including Jijjiga, into the Somali Regional government. Such territorial arrangement was viewed as an attempt to contain the growing Oromo nationalist movement and weaken a potential challenge to the Tigrayan-led minority regime. Consequently, border towns and villages have remained contested since 1991. To solve this problem which involved more than 420 kebeles (the smallest administrative units), the federal government organized a referendum in October 2004. Approximately 80% of the kebeles inhabiting areas near the Oromo – Somali/ Darod borders voted to be part of Oromia (link). However, the decision didn’t sit well with the notion of Greater Somalia, and the expansionist ambitions of the Darod clan leadership continued. The Darod-led Somali regional administration disputed or rejected the outcome. In areas such as Chinaksen in East Hararghe, which was a historically Oromo territory and decided to be part of Oromia by the referendum, armed groups of Darod militias raised Somali regional flags, challenged Oromia’s administrative authority, and forcibly displaced local Oromo residents. Unfortunately, the central government chose not to intervene. These developments established a pattern in which territorial aggression increasingly substituted the voice of the local people even at places the Oromos are decisive majority. This caused deaths and displacement of large numbers of Oromo communities.
Between 2007 and 2008, following renewed insurgency involving the ONLF, Ethiopian authorities supported the establishment of the Somali Regional State’s special police force, commonly known as the Liyu Police. Under the leadership of Abdi Mohammed Omar, popularly known as Abdi Illey, the force expanded into a heavily armed paramilitary organization (link). Although initially established to conduct counterinsurgency operations, the Liyu Police increasingly became engaged in expanding Darod territory and expelling Oromos from their own land. Oromo communities in several border districts reported incursions by heavily armed Liyu Police units.[18] These operations were associated with killings, destruction of property, looting, intimidation, and the displacement of civilians. Oromo farmers and pastoralist communities were particularly vulnerable in areas where local security forces lacked comparable military capabilities. There is a widely held belief among Oromo politicians, that the TPLF/OPDO central and regional governments allowed the gross human rights violation of the Oromo to suppress the growing Oromo national movement led by the OLF.
Human Rights Watch documented serious abuses by the Liyu Police, including extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detention, torture, and forced displacement both in Oromia and in the Somali Region. Reports of abuses and incursions affecting neighboring Oromo communities contributed to growing concerns about the force’s operations and accountability. The Liyu Police’s close relationship with the federal security establishment during the TPLF/ EPRDF era further complicated efforts to investigate allegations of cross-border abuses.
Between 2017 and 2018, the Somali regional state and the central government facilitated the forceful evictions of thousands of Oromos from the Somali Regional State and its surroundings (link). Actually, we do not know how many Oromos were killed or maimed and the amount economic resources they lost. Currently, Somali forces are attacking and killing Oromos in Mieso and Afdem in Eastern Oromia, killing 10 and wounding 12 people.[19] Still, the central government and the Oromia Regional State do not protect Oromo citizens.
Throughout the 2000s and early 2010s, tensions continued in border districts, including Moyale, Miesso, and Babile. Although some clashes originated in local resource disputes, the increasing involvement of Darod-led regional security forces and armed groups transformed these disagreements into broader territorial and political aggression.[20]
Between 2014 and 2018,the widespread Oromo protest movement exposed deep political divisions within Ethiopia’s federal system. Relations between the Oromia regional administration and the federal government became increasingly strained. By December 2016, the Somali Liyu Police, ostensibly a Darod Police, escalated its armed aggression against communities in east Oromia. Repeated incursions and attacks were reported across the regional boundary. Human Rights Watch documented extensive abuses during the aggression including massive violence and mass displacement; more than one million Oromos were displaced over the course of the conflict (link). The 2016 escalation marked a major turning point, demonstrating how heavily armed local police could destabilize the entire region causing havoc, and developing into a large-scale humanitarian crisis for Oromo communities.
Following the arrest of former Somali Regional President Abdi Mohammed Omar (Abdi Illey) in August 2018, armed groups and rogue militias associated with the Somali regional security structure reportedly launched artillery attacks and cross-border raids into Oromia. The reported attacks killed 21 Oromo civilians, wounded 61 others, and forced approximately 5,000 people to flee toward Kenya (link). These incidents demonstrated the continuing danger posed by armed groups operating outside effective regional and federal control. Ignoring the heinous crimes committed under the leadership of Abdi Mohammed Omar (Abdi Illey) against the Oromo, Abiy Ahmed released Abdi Illey from prison on March 14, 2024.
Between July and October 2025, renewed territorial expansion and border violence irrupted, following the creation of new administrative districts by the Somali regional administration, involving territories administered by Oromia in parts of the Borana, Bale, and East Hararghe zones. The one-sidedly drawn borders and administrative changes intensified the suffering of the Oromo communities along the border line and deep into Oromia. According to the UN OCHA report, the violence had displaced more than 288,000 people across affected border districts by October 2025 (link).
On October 18, 2026, heavy fighting erupted in the town of Moyale following the opening of a new administrative office by Somali regional authorities and the raising of the Somali regional flag in an area administered by Oromia. The reported confrontation involved Somali regional forces and Oromo community members. Reports attributed to Dawan Africa and Latin Times claimed that dozens of people were killed, including a 13-year-old Oromo girl who tried to remove the Somali flag posted in Oromo territory. Since the conflict is still ongoing, it is impossible to determine how many people were killed and wounded on both sides. As many as 50,000 residents were displaced, with some fleeing across the border into Kenya (link). The incident illustrates the persistence of territorial aggression by the Darod extremists and the potential consequences of unilateral administrative actions. In fact, it is simple to conclude that this conflict in Moyale is the continuation of the Greater Somalia project. Ernest Gellner notes that the Somalis considered “the Oromo as a kind of human population without a set form, a pre-ethnic raw material, waiting to be turned either into Amharas or into Somalis by the turn of political fortune and religious conversion.”[21]
The repeated exposure of Oromo communities to Darod armed incursions, the continued territorial pressure and land grab, and displacement of Oromos along the regional boundary have become a central issue of Oromo territorial integrity. The radical Darod Somali politicians of Kenya wish to expand Somali territories as far as Adama in Oromia and dream to also overwhelm Borana regions of Kenya. The idea of Greater Somalia by Darodian politicians and activists must be confronted and challenged because it is a highly toxic political enterprise in East Africa. These politicians and activists should work on establishing a central Somali government rather than making noises in Jijjiga, Mogadishu, Nairobi, and Darod-concentrated few European and American cities and forget the dead dream of Greater Somalia.
Conclusion
A chronological examination of Darod political history reveals several major developments that have contributed to Somalia’s political instability.
First, Barre’s decision to invade Ethiopia in 1977 was driven by the Greater Somalia project. The defeat weakened Somalia and contributed to a severe refugee crisis, economic pressure, and political instability.
Second, the MOD arrangement allowed Barre to construct a political network around relatives and selected subclan allies. The exclusion of other political groups intensified resentment and weakened national institutions. After the 1978 coup attempt, the government targeted Majeerteen communities. Later, government forces used collective-punishment tactics against Isaaq civilians and conducted severe repression against Hawiye communities.
Third, the 1988–1990 military campaign against the SNM and the Isaaq civilian population was among the most devastating episodes of the Siad Barre dictatorship. The destruction of Hargeisa and Burao and the killing of tens of thousands of civilians severely damaged the possibility of political reconciliation under Barre and beyond.
Fourth, the collapse of the regime did not establish a neutral political order. Armed factions and political organizations competed for territories, resources, and control of the state. Darod civilians also experienced violence and displacement during this period. Failure to establish accountability, democracy, and a negotiated political settlement contributed to further cycles of conflict.
Fifth, the establishment of Puntland and Jubaland created regional political institutions. However, disputes over territories, resources, elections, and the relationship between regional administrations and central authorities have continued to challenge Somalia’s political development.
These undertakings of extreme Darod clan activists involved specific political decisions, military operations, and chains of responsibility that are not yet accounted for. The central lesson is that political systems based on clan supremacy and personal loyalty undermine national institutions and deepen social divisions. The concentration of state resources and political authority among a narrow network of clan-connected leaders generates exclusion, rebellion, and violence. Somalia’s experience demonstrates the dangers of allowing genealogy and patronage to take precedence over equal citizenship, constitutional government, and public accountability.
Clan politics is difficult to check against international laws and societal norms. It is governed by emotions that don’t allow logic. Today we see the consequences of such emotions that are mobilizing clans to occupy lands that belong to others or destroy democracy that is led by others regardless of the voice of the majority. A durable Somali future requires accountability for individual and institutional perpetrators, recognition of victims from all communities, equal citizenship, constitutional government, and a full historical accounting of abuses committed by political and military institutions. When these rules are ignored and instability ensues even within, for example, Darod-controlled territories, an inevitable spillover mess follows, and the immediate neighbors such as the Oromo bear the consequences for decades, far more than countries that host a never-ending flow of refugees.
As mentioned above, recently Darod-led organized military offensive has been launched with the apparent aim of seizing land from the Borana Oromo around Moyale. The chronological examination of Darod political history mentioned above offers a sobering lesson, and that renewed territorial aggression and regional destabilization threaten not only the communities they are directed at, but also the prospects for regional peace and stability. Peace and stability are precisely the conditions most ostensibly needed in Somalia, where aspirations to establish a stable and centralized nation-state has eluded the international community for decades. It is difficult to explain why Somalia, a country with remarkable degree of linguistic and religious homogeneity, fell to consolidate itself as a functioning nation-state. The record examined here calls for the Darod clan politicians to take full historic responsibility for their role in the country’s unfortunate political trajectory. Regrettably, the ethos of clan-dominance is so deeply entrenched, extending beyond internal political arrangements with a recurring tendency to project this model of dominance onto neighboring communities and territories. The road to territorial integrity and construction of a nation-state starts from respecting the territory of others, especially when your own remains fractured.
Darod politicians understand that many Oromo critics view Abiy’s regime as anti-Oromo, associating it with the murders of prominent artist Hacaalu Hundessa and senior OLF member Batte Urgessa, the killing of thousands of civilians, and the imprisonment of thousands of Oromo politicians. The Oromo Liberation Front remains in armed conflict with the Ethiopian regime. Yet, certain Darod nationalist narratives deliberately conflate Ethiopianist imperial ideology with Oromo nationalism, providing a pretext for hostility and attacks against unarmed Oromo civilians.
They intentionally equate the imperial ideology of Ethiopia with Oromummaa (being Oromo) and Oromo nationalism to justify their attacks on unarmed Oromo civilians. In fact, their attack on Oromummaa is coordinated, with hate-driven narratives being systematically disseminated from diaspora-concentrated cities across Europe, as well as from Asmara, and Nairobi. Such hostility toward a people simply for being Oromo and expressing their cultural identity is not merely an attack on the Oromo people; it is an attack on humanity.
As a final note, responsibility for war and mass atrocities rests with the political leaders, military commanders, armed groups, and institutions that orchestrate, authorize, enable, or commit them, not with entire clans, families, or populations. Yet clan-based politics, rooted in collective allegiance to genealogy, stands as antithesis to the common good of humanity and remains fundamentally incompatible with commonly shared international norms. Ajust and peaceful world cannot be built on the exclusive foundations of clan loyalty which must be transcended or ultimately defeated.
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[1] The writing of this paper is motivated by an informative recent interview of a Somali scholar, Dr. Ismail Gorse, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FRIW20EqZRw&t=4147s
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