By Asfaw Beyene

I was taken aback by recent comments from two prominent political commentators of Somali ethnicity, Farah Maalim and Faisal Roble, both associated with Nairobi’s political circles. My focus here is on the remarks made by Faisal Roble.

In an interview with a media outlet unfamiliar to me, Faisal Roble expressed concern about what he described as the growing number of “ultra-nationalists” among the Oromo. He claimed that these nationalists had become so numerous, indeed, “huge” in number, that the phenomenon posed a danger to Ethiopia.

He then asked why Oromo nationalists had become so radicalized, suggesting that the movement’s supposed extremism might be explained by its being relatively new and youthful. As evidence of what he called the “pervasive” nature of Oromo nationalism, he alleged that Oromo nationalists were making territorial claims extending as far as Mogadishu, Djibouti, Yemen, Kenya, and Eritrea.

By the time I finished listening to the interview, I found myself wondering whether Faisal Roble had confused Somali ultra-nationalists with Oromo nationalists. Nearly every characteristic he attributed to Oromo nationalism seemed far more applicable to the historical record of Somali expansionist nationalism.

His argument deserves careful examination.

The Contradictions in Faisal Roble’s Argument

First, the history of radical nationalism in the Horn of Africa cannot be discussed without examining Somali expansionism.  Somali nationalism has a long and complicated history. Its expansionist manifestations, particularly the ideology of Greater Somalia, contributed to regional wars, territorial disputes, and political instability. Somalia’s own experience with authoritarian rule, civil war, and state collapse demonstrates the destructive potential of nationalism when it becomes inseparable from territorial ambition and political exclusion.

It would be simplistic to attribute Somalia’s decades of instability entirely to nationalism. Nevertheless, the historical consequences of expansionist and pervasive Somali nationalism are too significant to ignore.

Second, Faisal Roble describes Oromo nationalism as a danger to Ethiopia.  This assertion raises a fundamental question: a danger to which Ethiopia?  If Oromo nationalism seeks equality, self-determination, political representation, and the protection of Oromo rights, it can be considered a danger only to a political order that refuses to recognize those rights.

A political movement demanding justice for a historically marginalized people should not automatically be characterized as extremist. The distinction between legitimate national aspirations and exclusionary ultra-nationalism is essential.

Third, Faisal portrays Oromo nationalism as a new and youthful phenomenon.

This reflects a troubling misunderstanding of Oromo history.  The historical roots of Oromo collective identity, political institutions, resistance, and struggles over sovereignty extend back centuries. The Oromo played a major role in the political transformations of the Horn of Africa during the sixteenth century, long before the emergence of the modern Ethiopian state.

Modern Oromo nationalism took shape through subsequent historical experiences, particularly the incorporation of Oromo territories into the expanding Ethiopian Empire during the nineteenth century.  To describe Oromo nationalism simply as a new movement is to overlook this long historical trajectory.

Fourth, Faisal alleges that Oromo nationalists claim territories extending to Mogadishu, Djibouti, Yemen, Kenya, and Eritrea.  This is perhaps the most extraordinary part of his argument.  I have yet to encounter a credible statement by a recognized Oromo political party, organization, or prominent nationalist leader asserting territorial claims over Mogadishu, Yemen, Eritrea, or Djibouti.

If Faisal possesses such evidence, he should present it. Which Oromo political organization has made these claims? When were they made? In what official document or public statement?  Without such evidence, these allegations amount to a sweeping and potentially inflammatory misrepresentation of Oromo nationalism.

The irony is striking: the territorial ambitions he attributes to Oromo nationalists bear a much closer resemblance to the historically documented ideology of Greater Somalia.  This leads to a more important question: Why has Faisal Roble chosen this moment to launch such an attack on Oromo nationalism?  To explore that question, we must examine the emerging political connections between Nairobi, Mogadishu, and Jijjiga.

The Nairobi–Mogadishu–Jijjiga Nexus

Recent political developments in the Horn of Africa raise questions about the relationships among Somali nationalist networks, political actors in Somalia, and political movements operating within Ethiopia’s Somali Region.  Nairobi has long served as an important center for Somali political, commercial, and diaspora activity. Its significance as a meeting place for politicians, businesspeople, and opposition figures is well established.  However, the existence of these networks does not, by itself, establish that they operate under a coordinated political agenda.

What concerns me is the possibility that certain political actors are attempting to exploit regional tensions, territorial disputes, and opposition alliances to advance a renewed expansionist agenda.  This concern becomes particularly important when viewed alongside recent political developments in Ethiopia and the changing alliances among armed and opposition movements.

The Minnesota Fraud Cases and the Nairobi Connection

Recent federal fraud prosecutions in Minnesota have also drawn attention to the movement of stolen public funds into overseas investments, including real estate in Kenya.  Among the individuals named in connection with these cases, several of them have investments in Nairobi realestate. The diversion of funds intended to feed vulnerable children is deeply disturbing. Such misconduct betrays taxpayers’ trust, harms the communities these programs were designed to serve, and unfairly tarnishes the reputation of the many honest, hardworking Somali Americans who have contributed to their communities and American society.  Criminal responsibility rests with the individuals involved and should never be generalized to an entire ethnic or immigrant community. Nevertheless, for Oromos and Kenyans, reports of property acquisitions by individuals indicted in the Minnesota fraud cases, in a city (Nairobi) where allegations of a nonexistent Oromo ultranationalist movement have suddenly surfaced, raise legitimate concerns. This does not imply any connection between those implicated in Minnesota and political figures in Nairobi. Rather, the broader question is whether illicit financial networks, political influence, and regional nationalist agendas intersect in ways that warrant further investigation.

The ONLF and the Changing Political Alliances in Ethiopia

In September 2026, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF) was reported to have joined a coalition known as the Ethiopian Peoples’ Forces Alliance for Survival, bringing together seven armed and opposition organizations opposed to Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s administration.

The ONLF has historically pursued Somali self-determination in Ethiopia’s Somali Region. Its political trajectory must also be understood in the context of the broader history of Somali nationalism and the territorial disputes that have shaped relations between Ethiopia and Somalia.  The changing fortunes of opposition alliances, including those associated with the TPLF, may have created opportunities for other political movements to reposition themselves.

I am particularly concerned that some advocates of Somali expansionist nationalism may see these developments as an opportunity to revive older territorial ambitions.  Faisal Roble’s political commentary and Farah Maalim’s reported statements about support for the ONLF deserve examination in this context, despite political sympathy for an organization should not be confused with proof of operational involvement in its activities.  The critical issue is whether opposition to the Ethiopian government is being used to advance legitimate political demands or to reopen territorial conflicts between neighboring communities.

Moyale, Borana, and the Politics of Territorial Expansion

Recent tensions around Moyale and Borana territory have intensified these concerns.  Moyale lies in a historically sensitive borderland where Oromo and Somali communities, including Borana and Garri populations, have longstanding relationships shaped by trade, migration, political competition, and periodic conflict.

Reports of violence, including the alleged killing of a 13-year-old girl and the reported refusal to return her body to her family, are deeply disturbing. These allegations demand an independent investigation, accountability, and justice for the victim’s family.  No territorial or political dispute can justify the killing of a child.  This is extreme nationalism in action.

Of particular concern are reports that a Somali national flag, rather than the flag of Ethiopia’s Somali Regional State, was raised in contested territory.  If verified, such an act would carry political significance extending beyond an ordinary local dispute. It would raise questions about whether the conflict was being framed in terms of Somali national territorial ambitions rather than local administrative boundaries.  This is why I do not believe the tensions should be dismissed simply as a dispute between the Garri and Borana communities both of whom are Oromos and both of whom speak Oromo language.  There is a larger historical and political context that deserves examination.

The timing of Faisal Roble’s remarks, following heightened tensions and Oromo reactions to events in the area, is striking. His criticism of Oromo nationalism appears to reflect a broader political anxiety about Oromo resistance to territorial encroachment.  Whether this interpretation is correct requires further evidence. Nevertheless, it provides a compelling reason to examine the historical record of Somali expansionist nationalism.

Greater Somalia: The Historical Irony

Perhaps the greatest irony in Faisal Roble’s accusations is that the territorial expansionism he attributes to Oromo nationalists closely resembles the ideology of Greater Somalia.  The Greater Somalia project was not an imaginary accusation invented by political opponents. It was an explicit political objective promoted by extreme Somali nationalist movements and successive Somali governments.  Its central ambition was to unite Somali-inhabited territories across the Horn of Africa under a single political entity.  This included the Somali Republic, the Ogaden and other Somali-inhabited territories of Ethiopia, the Northern Frontier District of Kenya, and Djibouti.  The five-pointed star on Somalia’s flag historically symbolized these five Somali territories.

Under Siad Barre, this ideology became closely associated with military expansionism and the attempt to alter established international borders by force.  Thus, the history of Somali ultra-nationalism is not merely a history of territorial ambition. It is also a warning about the destructive consequences of authoritarianism, militarization, and exclusionary political identity.

Against this historical background, Faisal Roble’s portrayal of Oromo nationalism as uniquely expansionist becomes especially difficult to understand.

The Western Somali Liberation Front and the Ogaden War

The Western Somali Liberation Front (WSLF) provides one of the clearest historical examples of ultra nationalism and the territorial objectives associated with Greater Somalia.  Supported by the Somali government, the WSLF operated in eastern Ethiopia and played a significant role in the conflict that culminated in the 1977 – 1978 Ogaden War.  The name Western Somali Liberation Front itself reflected a territorial conception in which parts of internationally recognized Ethiopian territory were regarded as belonging to a broader Somali nation.

During the war, Somali forces advanced into substantial portions of eastern Ethiopia before being defeated by Ethiopian forces.  The conflict had devastating consequences for the region and its civilian populations, the broader military campaign and associated political movements affected Oromo communities and territories.  But the central point is undeniable: territorial revisionism was an explicit component of the Greater Somalia project, manifested as ultra nationalism.  These fanatical adventures to alter boarders by force led to the disintegration of the Somali state apparatus and the mushrooming of warlords.

Where, then, is the equivalent documented Oromo nationalist program claiming Mogadishu, Yemen, or Eritrea?  If Faisal Roble wishes to make that comparison, the burden of evidence rests with him.

From the WSLF to the ONLF

The decline of the WSLF and the emergence of the ONLF marked an important transformation in Somali nationalist politics in Ethiopia.  The ONLF emerged in the 1980s and eventually became a major political and armed organization advocating self-determination for ethnic Somalis in Ethiopia.  Although the ONLF and WSLF differed in their organizational structures, political circumstances, and stated objectives, their histories are connected to the broader question of Somali national identity and political sovereignty in the Horn of Africa.

The relationship between Somali nationalist movements and Oromo liberation organizations has also been complex.  At different times, their interests have converged around opposition to Ethiopian central governments. At other times, territorial competition, political rivalry, and conflicting national aspirations have generated serious tensions.  Historical attacks of Somali extremists on Oromo liberation figures, including the 10 massacred at Shinniga in 1980 have deeply saddened the Oromo people, leaving a historical scar.  Faisal shall pour no more fuel to these historic wounds and respect the brotherly sentiment that existed between Oromos and Somalis for centuries.

The Somali Abo Liberation Front and the Struggle Over Oromo Territory

During the 1970s, the Somali government supported extremist Somali movements operating in southern Ethiopia, including areas historically associated with the provinces of Bale, Sidamo, and Arsi.  These regions were primarily inhabited by Oromo populations.  The SALF mobilized some communities in these areas to suit Somalia’s regional political and military objectives.  Unlike the WSLF, which focused primarily on Somali national claims in eastern Ethiopia, the SALF’s activities extended into areas where Oromo identity and political aspirations were central.  It was a clear expansionist and extremist move to annex some Oromo territories including the Garri.

Following Somalia’s defeat in the Ogaden War, the Oromo Abo Liberation Front (OALF) emerged reflecting changing political identities and alliances.  The precise organizational relationship between the SALF and OALF, including claims about formal renaming and changes in political affiliation, remain beyond the scope of this paper.  Nevertheless, the broader history illustrates an important point: Somali state-sponsored political and military movements were active in territories inhabited by Oromo communities, and the growing national aspirations of Somali extremism was already evident decades ago.

This is the historical context in which false accusations of Oromo territorial expansionism must be evaluated.  It is important to note that out of such piles of political extremism was born Al-Shabaab, whose emergence was also shaped by a different mix of ideology, state collapse, and extremist politics.  There simply are no parallels to such extremism in the Oromo body politics, reason why Faisal’s statement itself comes as extreme.

Who Is Really Promoting Expansionist Nationalism?

Faisal Roble’s comments raise questions that cannot be avoided.  Why are political commentators such as Faisal Roble and Farah Maalim devoting so much attention to the alleged dangers of Oromo nationalism while appearing less concerned about the documented history of Somali territorial expansionism?  Why portray Oromo demands for political rights and territorial security as extremist while failing to apply the same scrutiny to the ideology of Greater Somalia?  And why should Oromo opposition to perceived territorial encroachment be interpreted as radicalization rather than as a legitimate concern about security, identity, and political rights?

These questions are especially important given the continuing challenges facing Somalia itself.

Somalia has struggled for decades with state fragmentation, armed insurgency, political instability, and the difficulty of establishing effective authority across its territory. Regional and international assistance, including sacrifices made by Ethiopian forces, has played a significant role in efforts to restore security.  I have no doubt that many of these forces come from Oromia.

Rather than reopening old territorial disputes, political leaders and commentators should devote greater attention to peace, accountable governance, economic development, and cooperation among the peoples of the Horn of Africa.

This is not an argument against Somali nationalism as an expression of cultural identity or legitimate political aspiration. Nor is it a criticism of Somali people, whose communities have suffered enormously from war, displacement, and political instability.  It is an argument against expansionist ultra-nationalism, regardless of who promotes it.

Conclusion: The Danger of Historical Amnesia

Faisal Roble’s criticism of Oromo nationalism suffers from a fundamental contradiction.  He warns against an alleged Oromo expansionist movement without identifying credible evidence of the extraordinary territorial claims he attributes to it. Yet the historical record contains extensive documentation of Somali nationalist movements that openly pursued territorial revisionism across the Horn of Africa.

The Greater Somalia project, the WSLF, the Ogaden War, and the history of Somali-backed political movements in southern Ethiopia are not matters of speculation. They are part of the region’s political history.

None of this means that Oromo nationalism should be exempt from criticism. Any nationalist movement can become intolerant, exclusionary, or extremist. Oromo nationalism, like every other political movement, should be judged by its principles, conduct, and respect for the rights of others.  But criticism must be grounded in evidence, not sweeping accusations or historical distortions.

If Faisal Roble believes that Oromo nationalists are claiming Mogadishu, Yemen, Djibouti, Eritrea, and Kenya, he should identify the organizations, leaders, statements, and documents that substantiate his allegations.  Until then, his claims remain unsupported.

The peoples of the Horn of Africa have suffered enough from territorial wars, political manipulation, and competing nationalist ambitions. They deserve a future based on mutual recognition, historical honesty, and respect for one another’s rights.  The real danger to Ethiopia and the wider Horn of Africa is not the legitimate expression of Oromo or Somali national identity. It is the revival of expansionist ideologies that treat the territories and rights of neighboring peoples as objects of political conquest.  That is the danger Faisal Roble should be addressing rather than projecting onto Oromo nationalism the very expansionist tendencies that have already caused so much suffering in the region.